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Guest workers on visas in the United States may be unable to quit bad employers due to barriers 
to mobility and a lack of labor market competition. Using H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B program data, 
we calculate the concentration of employers in geographically defined labor markets within 
occupations. We find that many guest workers face moderately or highly concentrated labor 
markets, based on federal merger scrutiny guidelines, and that concentration generally 
decreases wages. For example, moving from a market with an HHI of zero to a market 
comprised of two employers lowers H-1B worker wages approximately 10 percent, and a pure 
monopsony (one employer) reduces wages by 13 percent. A simulation shows that wages under 
pure monopsony could be 47 percent lower, suggesting that employers do not use the extent of 
their monopsony power. Enforcing wage regulations and decreasing barriers to mobility may 
better address issues of exploitation than antitrust scrutiny. 
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The emerging study of the power of employers to set wages below the market rate, i.e., 
monopsony power,1 has invigorated discussions on a variety of ailments in contemporary U.S. 
labor markets. Stagnant wages, labor shortages, labor market discrimination, growing inequality, 
and reduced workers’ rights could each be explained by growing employer market power over 
workers.2,3 While a vigorous debate has emerged over the degree to which the U.S. labor market 
is monopsonistic or competitive, few involved in the discussion of the political economy of 
employer power would dispute that guest worker programs could be characterized by 
monopsony. Such programs have been referred to as “a benefit to their employers, enabling them 
to get workers at a lower wage” by Milton Friedman, the late economist associated with 
neoliberal economics, and “monopsony visas” by Heidi Shierholz, an economist with the union-
backed EPI.4  
Prominent scholars of both economics and law have recently proposed using existing 
regulations under antitrust law to counter monopsony power in the labor market.5 As a growing 
body of empirical research finds that employers possess oligopsony power and that this has 
negative effects on wages across the U.S.,6 studying a specific context in which employer power 
                                                
1 Monopsony refers to a single buyer of an input, and is the counterpart to monopoly in output markets. Oligopsony 
refers to two or more large buyers of an input, and is the counterpart of oligopoly. Both situations can lead to 
departures from perfect competition. We refer to monopsony power interchangeably with employer power, 
imperfect competition in labor markets, monopsonistic labor markets, finite elasticity, or inelastic labor supply.  
2 The best available estimates of labor market competitiveness in the U.S. suggest that the average firm has some 
market power over workers. See Douglas A. Webber. Firm Market Power and the Earnings Distribution. Labour 
Economics. 35 (2015): 123-134. 
3 See Christopher L. Erickson & Daniel J.B. Mitchell. Monopsony as a Metaphor for the Emerging Post-Union 
Labour Market. International Labour Review, 146(3-4), 163-187. (2007). 
4 Friedman is quoted in Paul Donnelly, H-1B Is Just Another Government Subsidy, Computerworld (July 22, 2002); 
Shierholz is quoted in Economic Policy Institute, Monopoly, Monopsony, and the Labor Market: Declining Worker 
Power in an Era of Market Concentration, Washington, D.C. (December 12, 2018), 
https://www.epi.org/event/monopoly-monopsony/. 
5 See Suresh Naidu et al., Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power. HARVARD LAW REVIEW. (2018); Ioana 
Marinescu & Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets, 93 IND. L.J. (forthcoming) 
6 See e.g., José Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration, National Bureau of Economic Research, WP 24147 (2017); 
Efraim Benmelech et al., Strong Employers and Weak Employers: How Does Employer Concentration Affect 
Wages?, National Bureau of Economic Research, WP 24307 (2018); Kevin Rinz, Labor Market Concentration, 
Earnings Inequality, and Earning Mobility, CARRA Working Paper Series, CARRA-WP-2018-10. (2018); Brad 
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is assumed to exist provides an opportunity to address several important questions for this 
literature. One critical question involves the source of monopsony power. Frictions and barriers 
to job-to-job mobility could make it difficult for foreign-born nationals to quit, weakening 
employee bargaining power. An alternative explanation for these conditions could be that a small 
number of employers, or an oligopsony, can dominate the market for guest workers in a 
particular occupation and region, thus empowering firms to dictate wages and terms of 
employment.7,8 Several recent lawsuits brought by guest workers allege collusion among 
employers to suppress wages in specific labor markets, in violation of antitrust law.9 
Determining the source of monopsony power is important for developing effective 
solutions for labor market dysfunction. The consequences of bad policy are substantial. For 
example, guest worker visa programs that permit foreign-born workers to be temporarily 
employed in occupations experiencing labor shortages have been criticized for well-documented 
cases of poor working conditions and exploitation.10 These conditions in some cases involve 
illegal employer conduct, such as wage theft, coercion, fraud, and abuse.11  
                                                
Hershbein et al., Concentration in U.S. local labor markets: evidence from vacancy and employment. data, Working 
Paper (2018); Yue Qiu & Aaron J. Sojourner, Labor-Market Concentration and Labor Compensation SSRN WP 
3312197 (2019). 
7 Concerns about oligopsony and the capture of these programs by intermediaries have been recognized in 
government reports. In 2013, 44% of U.S. employers hiring H-2A and H-2B guest workers indicated that they were 
using an intermediary. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-15-154, Increased Protections Needed for 
Foreign Workers (2015), at 26 [hereinafter GAO]. 
8 The top 20 sponsors of H-1B visas increased their share of initial employment from 8% to 40% between 2000 and 
2012. See Anna Maria Mayda et al. New Data and Facts on H-1B Workers Across Firms, in Ina Ganguli et. al. eds., 
The Role of Immigrants and Foreign Students in Science, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship, University of Chicago 
Press (2018). 
9 See Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23940; Llacua v. Western Range Ass'n., 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 193120, and discussion, Infra., at Section 1.B.3.	
10 See e.g., Lance Compa, Migrant Workers in The United States: Connecting Domestic Law with International 
Labor Standards, 92 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 211 (2017); Grace Meng, Cultivating Fear: The Vulnerability of Immigrant 
Farmworkers in the US to Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment, Human Rights Watch. 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/15/cultivating-fear/vulnerability-immigrant-farmworkers-ussexual-violence-
and-sexual (2012); Mary Bauer, Close to Slavery: Guestworker Programs in the United States, Southern Poverty 
Law Center. https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/SPLCClose-to-
Slavery-2013.pdf, (2013). 
11 See GAO, supra, and for full discussion of the extent of documented abuses, see Infra, Section 1.B.2. 
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Foreign-born nationals on temporary guest worker visas are likely to be more vulnerable 
to employer market power than the typical worker for several reasons. The key market check on 
bad working conditions is the power of a worker to freely quit a job and take up work with a new 
employer. Two forms of monopsony power, monopsonistic competition arising from frictions 
and oligopsony arising from concentration, can reduce an employee’s ability to quit and thus 
might contribute to the situation guest workers find themselves in. “Natural frictions” include the 
practical barriers that keep a person from seeking a new job such as imperfect information, 
preferences, and customs that might deter a guest worker from searching for new jobs.  
“Institutional frictions” include administrative and legal factors which might increase the costs of 
worker mobility and decrease employer entry into these labor markets. Both natural and 
institutional frictions can lead to “monopsonistic competition” or the state in which the 
availability of outside job options fails to deliver all the benefits of a perfectly competitive labor 
market on account of high costs to switching jobs. Finally, “oligopsony” can occur when markets 
become too concentrated to deliver competitive outcomes. Oligopsony is potentially the only 
cause of heightened monopsony power over guest workers that can be addressed by antitrust 
law.12 
This paper contributes to the growing antitrust and monopsony literature by presenting 
new evidence on the question of whether oligopsony has an impact on guest worker wages, and 
then addressing whether antitrust policy is a fruitful venue through which to address many of the 
problems of the guest worker programs. Applying the theory of monopsony to real antitrust 
lawsuits involving collusion among firms poses significant challenges when trying to calculate 
                                                
12 Suresh Naidu, & Eric A. Posner, Labor Monopsony and the Limits of the Law, Working Paper (2018). 
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damages.13 Applying the principles and existing tools of antitrust law enforcement to 
concentrations of oligopsonistic labor markets holds promise, and empowering federal regulators 
to scrutinize mergers is a notable, yet untested, idea.14 While regulators have signaled an interest 
in aggressively enforcing antitrust policies in the labor market, it was only recently that they 
issued a memorandum warning employers of their intent to prosecute any future unlawful 
collusion.15 At the same time, empirical analysis of oligopsony in the context of labor markets 
must also be aware of other classical legal avenues to address and counter imbalances of 
employer power and monopsonistic competition even in the absence of oligopsony. For example, 
guest worker programs are regulated across the world, and typically include mobility restraints as 
well as wage regulations, a numerical cap on visas, and time limits that imply strong institutional 
and natural frictions to quitting apart from oligopsony.16  
In this study, we analyze whether oligopsonistic concentrations of employers contribute 
to the suppression of guest worker wages for three guest worker programs in the United States. 
To identify whether oligopsony is relevant to guest worker concerns, we first search scholarly 
law and case law databases to examine whether there is an interest in monopsony and antitrust in 
the legal community. We find that of 163 federal lawsuits brought related to the guest worker 
programs since 1990, only two were under antitrust statutes. We then apply Department of 
Justice (DOJ) standards to employer and occupation level data from the Department of Labor’s 
Labor Condition Application (LCA) database for the H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B programs. We use 
regression analysis to establish a correlation between concentration and wages. To our 
                                                
13 Christina DePasquale, Collusive Monopsony and Antitrust Damages. The Antitrust Bulletin, 54(4), 907-921 
(2009). 
14 Naidu et al., supra; Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra. 
15 Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download (2016). 
16 See Adam S. Chilton et al., Optimal Design of Guest Worker Programs: An Introduction, The Journal of Legal 
Studies, 47, no. S1 (January 2018): S1-S4. 
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knowledge, we are the first in this literature to explore this relationship in the guest worker 
market.17 We find that between approximately one quarter and one third of H-1B and H-2B guest 
workers are employed in labor markets that meet or exceed the DOJ criteria for a concentrated 
market, and that an increase in the level of market concentration from perfect competition to a 
market with only two firms is associated with a decline in wages up to 10 percent. Further, our 
calibration of a new theoretical model in this literature suggests that both oligopsonistic 
concentration and frictions play a role in imperfect competition in this market. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section I.A., we provide an overview of 
economic thought on perfect and imperfect competition in labor markets and the implications of 
each for workers and firms. In Section I.B., we review the wide array of recent abuses alleged to 
occur to workers in the guest worker programs, and the institutional constraints they labor under. 
In Section II, we examine data on the guest worker programs to understand whether 
concentrations exist in excess of federal merger scrutiny guidelines, whether associations 
between higher concentration levels and lower wages exist. Using a new model, we analyze how 
the results can be informative about the roles of both frictions and concentration in depressing 
guest worker wages.  In Section III, we discuss our results and offer some policy implications of 
our findings. 
I.  MONOPSONY AND MIGRATION 
A. An Overview of Monopsony Power  
                                                
17 For prior research that considers concentration among H-1B employers, see Anna Maria Mayda et al., The Effect 
of the H-1B Quota on the Employment and Selection of Foreign-Born Labor, European Economic Review 108 
(2018): 105-128. 
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With the exception of a few specialized areas in baseball and collegiate sports,18 antitrust 
concerns have long focused on output (i.e., product) markets and not input (i.e., labor) markets. 
Among economists, the consensus neoclassical model of perfect competition in labor markets 
surely reduced beliefs in the need for antitrust enforcement. Likely influenced by earlier work in 
the fields of industrial organization and trade,19 as well as developments in the search literature 
within labor economics,20 the twenty-first century breakdown in assumptions of perfect 
competition in labor markets began with the publication of Alan Manning’s book, Monopsony in 
Motion.21 Manning proposed that the existence of frictions, such as the costs of job search, 
explain several observed labor market outcomes not predicted under perfect competition.  The 
frictions posited by Manning explain these outcomes even in cases where several firms are 
competing to hire from the same pool of workers. In this section, we discuss two labor market 
structures — the first being the perfectly competitive framework and the second being a 
monopsonistic model, which is a framework nested within neo-classical economics. We also 
catalog the sources of monopsony power that can lead to imperfect competition in labor markets. 
1. Perfect Competition and Monopsonistic Models 
In a perfectly competitive model, a firm pays the last worker hired exactly what he or she 
is worth to the firm. In a monopsonistic model, a firm will pay the last worker hired only a 
                                                
18 See e.g., Ted Tatos, Deconstructing the NCAA’s Procompetitive Justifications to Demonstrate Antitrust Injury and 
Calculate Lost Compensation: The Evidence Against NCAA Amateurism. The Antitrust Bulletin, 62(1), 184-236 
(2017). 
19 See e.g., Steven Berry et al. Automobile prices in market equilibrium. Econometrica, 841-890 (1995); Paul 
Krugman. Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade. The American Economic Review, 
70(5), 950-959 (1980). Marc J. Melitz. The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry 
productivity. Econometrica, 71, no. 6: 1695-1725 (2003). 
20 Kenneth Burdett & Dale T. Mortensen. Wage differentials, employer size, and unemployment. International 
Economic Review, 257-273 (1998). 
21 Alan Manning, Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets, Princeton University Press, 
(2003). The model was originally proposed in Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition, Springer, 
(1969). We discuss her pioneering contributions in more detail below. 
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fraction of her or his worth.  Under the perfectly competitive framework, firms are price takers in 
wages, facing a perfectly elastic labor supply curve. In such a case, no worker would willingly 
work at a firm paying even slightly less than other firms; thus, even a 0.01% cut in wages would 
yield a 100% decrease in labor supply to the firm, in other words, the firm faces an infinitely 
(perfectly) elastic labor supply curve. Under imperfect competition, the labor supply curve to an 
individual firm is no longer perfectly elastic. In the monopsonistic model, workers cannot easily 
quit low-paying firms on account of the sources of monopsony power we describe below, such as 
market concentration or frictions. In a monopsonistic labor market, if the elasticity is two, a 10% 
cut to a firm’s wages will reduce the number of workers willing to work for the firm in question 
by 20%, whereas in a perfectly competitive market, the elasticity of supply would be infinity, as 
no worker would work at a firm that pays even a cent below the market wage. In summary, firms 
in competitive labor markets must pay the “going rate” or lose all of their workers, while firms in 
a monopsony model face an upward sloping labor supply curve where a wedge exists between 
wages earned and the value of the worker, yielding what Joan Robinson and other economists 
have called exploitation. 
With knowledge of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, it is possible to calculate the 
markdown between an employee’s wage (w) and what the employee would earn in a competitive 
market. In a competitive labor market, we assume that the last worker hired would earn exactly 
what they contribute to the firm’s bottom line, their Marginal Revenue Product of Labor or 
MRPL. The markdown is one minus the elasticity divided by the elasticity plus one.22 For 
example, if the elasticity is two, this worker will be paid 67% of their worth to the firm and 
                                                
22 Thus, in a competitive labor market wages are w = MRPL, and in a monopsonistic labor market, wages are 
w=("#$%)	( (()*) where epsilon ε is the elasticity of labor supply to the firm. Markdown can be conceptualized as 
the percentage decrease in a monopsonistic wage relative to a competitive wage.  
 10 
markdown is therefore 33%, while if the elasticity is nine, the worker receives 90% of their 
worth, and the markdown is therefore 10%. As the elasticity increases toward infinity, the share 
of worth paid approaches 100%, consistent with the predictions of the perfectly competitive 
model. A recent meta-analysis that examined over 700 estimates from 38 publications finds 
elasticities consistent with employers having the power to markdown wages between one-sixth 
and one-third of the wage that workers would earn in a competitive market.23   
When applied to a real labor market context and the antitrust policies of the United 
States, the utility of the monopsony model is limited by several constraints. Antitrust law makes 
only specific exercises of employer monopsony power unlawful or suspect. The economic model 
of monopsony does not make such stark distinctions. Under a simple model of monopsony, the 
degree of power that firms have over workers is determined entirely by the elasticity of labor 
supply to the firm, which can be finite due to unlawful as well as natural and other lawful causes. 
To further categorize the sources of monopsony, we now proceed to discuss these potential 
causes of monopsony power. 
2. Labor Markets Characterized by Frictions and Concentration 
If a single firm comprises the entirety of labor demand in a given market (such as in a 
“company town”), the employer will clearly hold power over workers. In this case of pure 
monopsony, the firm will face the upward sloping market labor supply curve as not all workers 
will quit even when wages are cut. In Joan Robinson’s original conception of the monopsony 
model, she proposed three specific reasons why firms may face an upward sloping labor supply 
curve even when different firms compete for the same workers.  
                                                
23 Anna Sokolova & Todd A. Sørensen. Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Meta-Analysis. Institute for the Study of 
Labor (IZA) WP No. 11966. (2018). 
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First, moderate geographic isolation may limit the number of workers who are available 
to work for a firm and who bear negligible commuting costs. Once the supply of these very local 
workers has been exhausted, a firm must then seek workers from outside its immediate 
geographic area, and pay them at a higher rate that includes explicit compensation as well as 
implicit compensation for the commuting costs that the workers must bear. Second, she argues 
that the “preference or custom” of workers may keep the worker tied to specific firms; this is 
conceptually similar to how market power in product markets arises in the form of monopolistic 
competition, where firms offer differentiated products to consumers with heterogeneous tastes. 
Finally, Robinson argues that simple ignorance of competing job opportunities may prevent 
perfect mobility of workers from lower paying to higher paying jobs. 
For many decades, despite Robinson’s argument for the existence of monopsonistic labor 
markets, most of what little attention academics paid to the monopsony model centered around 
rare cases of pure monopsony. Contemporary thought began to change with the publication of 
Manning’s book, which is rooted in labor search models. The “New Monopsony” framework 
builds on search models by Dale Mortensen, which contributed to his award of the Nobel 
Memorial Prize in economics. Specifically, the Burdett-Mortensen search model mathematically 
formalizes the role of frictions in the labor market.24 Just as frictions in physics explain why 
objects in motion eventually come to rest in spite of inertia, frictions in the labor market help to 
explain why all workers will not instantaneously and costlessly flow from one job to another in 
response to the slightest wage difference. In other words, search frictions imply that labor 
markets are not perfectly competitive. 
                                                
24 See Burdett & Mortensen, supra. 
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Manning’s work implies that the existence of frictions in search models creates finite 
labor supply elasticities to the firm. Thus, even when many firms are competing to hire the same 
workers, firms will have the power to choose the wage that they set, rather than have a specific 
wage from a perfectly competitive market dictated to them. Additionally, Manning develops a 
new framework for empirical estimation of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm, spurring a 
large growth in empirical estimates of this parameter. In empirical estimations using Manning’s 
framework, any factor which reduces the frequency at which workers receive outside job offers 
will lead to measurable increases of employer labor market power. From a policy standpoint, the 
source of monopsony power does matter, and measurements that do not separate the source of 
monopsony power may have limited utility. 
Challenges to conventional wisdom, by their nature, must often begin with an antithetical 
rebuke of an existing paradigm before developing a new more comprehensive thesis. This 
process certainly seems to be in motion for the labor economics literature on monopsony. Recent 
literature has moved beyond simply providing empirical evidence consistent with the existence 
of labor market frictions, and thus inconsistent with perfect competition, to now attempting to 
identify the sources of such frictions more clearly.25 In addition, recent work has begun to focus 
on explicitly anti-competitive instruments such as no-poach and non-compete agreements,26 
moving costs,27  and market concentration.28  
                                                
25 For one exception, see Peter Brummund, Variation in Monopsonistic Behavior Across Establishments: Evidence 
from the Indonesian Labor Market, Working Paper (2011). 
26 Natarajan Balasubramania et al., Locked In? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and the Careers of 
High-Tech Workers, US Census Bureau Center for Economic Studies Paper No. CES-WP-17-09 (2018); Alan B. 
Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector, Princeton IRS 
Working Paper No. 614 (2017). 
27 Tyler Ransom, Labor Market Frictions and Moving Costs of the Employed and Unemployed, Working Paper 
(2018).  
28 Benmelech et al., supra; Azar et al., supra. 
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3. Implications of Monopsonistically Competitive and Oligopsonistic Markets 
Market concentration limits the number of firms competing to hire workers in the labor 
market, yielding reduced outside options for workers. We can think of this as a concentrated or 
oligopsonistic labor market. When frictions other than concentration limit how easy it is to move 
between jobs, we can think of this as leading to monopsonistically competitive markets. As noted 
above, Robinson proposed that in addition to geographic isolation, factors such as worker 
preferences and ignorance of outside options can increase firm market power. In essence, 
ignorance is the cornerstone of the information frictions present in search models.  
Oligopsonistic markets can be addressed in part by traditional antitrust policies such as 
increased scrutiny over mergers, especially when market concentration is already high and any 
merger will further increase this concentration.29 Measures used in product markets, such as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), can be used to subject any proposed merger to scrutiny 
using a market definition and concentration approach. 30 A similar approach based on market 
definition and market concentration could be a means of examination of market power in specific 
labor markets that are highly regulated, such as the market for guest workers. 
Frictions, whether natural or institutionally constructed, will effectively thin the size of 
the labor market for a given worker seeking a new job. There is a clear role for antitrust policy 
involving “institutional frictions” such as explicitly anti-competitive firm behavior involving 
monopsonistic collusion (e.g., no-poaching agreements, anti-enticing law, non-compete 
agreements).31 Antitrust policy may help restore labor markets to a more competitive state in this 
situation and litigation can right certain wrongs. In the case of guest workers, however, legally 
                                                
29 See Naidu, et al., supra. 
30 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (2010).	
31 See Naidu & Posner, supra. 
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imposed barriers to mobility create institutional frictions that thin the labor market. Where this is 
the case, legislation would be required to address these inadequacies of the programs.  
In addition to oligopsony and “institutional frictions,” labor markets may be plagued by 
“natural frictions” that arise from the environment but are not enforced by the law. Naidu & 
Posner argue that antitrust policies alone are not sufficient for addressing the consequences of 
imperfect competition which would arise even under laissez-faire.32 In a simulation, they show 
the impact of different levels of concentration as measured by HHI on wage. To address the 
implications of monopsony power, Naidu & Posner suggest policies including stronger wage 
regulation, mandatory benefits, and stronger unions. While it is rare to see strong wage 
regulations in the United States, in the case of guest worker programs, the federal government 
has a heavy hand in setting the wages paid to workers by private sector firms. 
Above, we distinguished sources of monopsony power between concentration – leading 
to oligopsony – and frictions – leading to monopsonistic competition. Below, in Section II.D., 
we attempt to quantify the relative importance of these different causes of deviation from a 
competitive labor market. In the following section, we proceed to describe the state of the art 
with respect to research on monopsony and immigration, provide institutional details about the 
guest worker programs, and details of the manner in which courts and advocates have pursued 
claims against employers under antitrust and other laws.  
B. Guest Worker Programs and Monopsony 
Features of guest worker programs provide an excellent setting to study monopsony and 
antitrust problems in general, and a handful of empirical studies in the economics literature 
                                                
32 See Id. 
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already find some evidence that firms hold monopsony power over immigrants.33 As 
background, guest worker programs provide an important supply of labor to the U.S., with 
estimates of the number of guest workers ranging from 740,000 - 1.4 million workers in the U.S. 
in 2013.34 Depew, Norlander & Sørensen35 (DNS) provide estimates that demonstrate that the 
degree and nature of mobility that H-1B and L-1 workers experience in the U.S. is not consistent 
with the notion that these workers are completely immobile indentured servants, tied to a single 
firm for the duration of their visa. While DNS rejects the claim the guest workers are completely 
immobile, their estimates are consistent with a monopsonistic labor market in which firms enjoy 
a significant degree of wage setting power over these workers. Using estimates calculated with 
the monopsony model wage setting equation, DNS found that workers on H-1B visas were paid 
63.5% of their worth to their firm at an average unemployment rate of 7.89 percent.36	Naidu et al. 
examine labor markets for low-skilled guest workers in the United Arab Emirates, finding much 
more firm power over workers, along with evidence that the frictions imposed by such programs 
significantly lower wages further.37 
                                                
33 For studies of monopsony and undocumented immigrants, see Julie L. Hotchkiss & Myriam Quispe-Agnoli, 
Employer Monopsony Power in the Labor Market for Undocumented Workers, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
Working Paper 2009-14D (2009); Boris Hirsch & Elke J. Jahn, Is there Monopsonistic Discrimination Against 
Immigrants? ILR Review, 68(3), 501–528 (2012). 
34 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate. Estimates of the Size and 
Characteristics of the Resident Nonimmigrant Population in the United States: Fiscal Year, 2014, (2016); See also 
Daniel Costa & Jennifer Rosenbaum, Temporary Foreign Workers by the Numbers, Economic Policy Institute, 
(2017). 
35 Briggs Depew, Peter Norlander & Todd A. Sørensen. Inter-firm Mobility and Return Migration Patterns of Skilled 
Guest Workers, Journal of Population Economics, 30(2), 681-721 (2017)[hereinafter DNS]. See also Jennifer Hunt 
& Bin Xie. How Restricted is the Job Mobility of Skilled Temporary Work Visa Holders?,  Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, 38: 41-64 (2017). 
36 These results are based on the assumption that the elasticity of labor supply to the firm is -2 multiplied by the 
voluntary separation elasticity. 
37 Suresh Naidu et al., Monopsony Power in Migrant Labor Markets: Evidence from the United Arab 
Emirates, Journal of Political Economy, 124(6), 1735-1792, (2016). That paper examines a policy reform that eased 
mobility restrictions for guest workers. While the U.S. relaxed mobility restrictions in AC21, which was signed into 
law in October 2000, that event that precedes the coverage of the data examined here. 
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One would expect that abuses of workers in these programs would at least be partially 
reined in by competition in the labor market. Previous statements made by policymakers in 
support of liberalizing reforms support this. The American Competitiveness and Worker 
Investment Act for the 21st Century of 2000 (AC21) reformed the H-1B program in order to ease 
mobility restrictions for workers seeking to switch employers. Senator Orrin Hatch motivated the 
role for competitive market pressures by stating “the market would not tolerate exploitation, 
especially given the fierce competition for skilled workers.”38 Indeed, the first theorem of 
Welfare Economics states that any competitive market will always produce Pareto-Efficient 
outcomes, given some conditions.39  
Those admitted legally through guest worker visa programs are vulnerable to employer 
abuse and exploitation because the markets are not perfect, although the sources of these 
imperfections have not been quantitatively parceled out. The core issue is that guest workers are 
less free to quit than their counterparts who have green cards or are citizens.40 In the next section, 
we address institutional frictions in guest worker programs that limit the freedom to quit and may 
lead to abuse independent of oligopsony. We then report on abuses that occur in guest worker 
programs based upon the results of a search for relevant law review articles and court cases 
related to exploitation seen in guest worker programs. We conclude with a discussion of several 
                                                
38 See DNS, supra, at 4, citing Orrin Hatch, U.S Senate, Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report, American 
Competitiveness in the 21st century,106-260 (2000). 
39 Kenneth J Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22 Econometrica, 
256 (1954). 
40 Guest worker visas are called nonimmigrant visas because they do not lead to citizenship. Every guest worker visa 
restricts the ability of the visa holder to switch jobs by making it either explicitly unlawful to quit a job and remain 
in the country lawfully, or by requiring guest workers to obtain sponsorship from another employer in order to 
lawfully leave employment and remain in the country. Several of these visas are considered dual intent, under which 
guest workers can apply for citizenship while on the non-immigrant visa. See Ron Hira, Bridge to Permanent 
Immigration or Temporary Labor?, US Engineering in a Global Economy, 263 (2018); Norman Matloff, On the 
Need for Reform of the H-1B Non-Immigrant Work Visa in Computer-Related Occupations, 36 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 815 (2002-2003) on frictions created by the process. 
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relevant cases and law review articles that raise questions that are particularly germane to 
antitrust issues and guest worker programs. 
1. Institutional Frictions 
Guest worker programs layer additional institutional frictions that may enhance monopsony 
power on top of the typical frictions of a labor market, and it is possible that remedies 
fundamentally lie not with antitrust, but through immigration, labor policy, and enforcement, 
whether by regulatory process, court decisions, or new legislation. For such legislation or 
enhanced enforcement of antitrust law to be effective, it is imperative to ascertain the extent to 
which different sources of monopsony influence the outcomes seen in guest worker programs. 
Institutional frictions limit employees’ ability to search for new jobs and reduce the incentive for 
employers to enter the market for guest workers. Nearly all visas prohibit a guest worker from 
working for more than one firm at a time. Certain visas, such as the L-1 visa for intra-company 
transfer, prohibit workers from switching employers at all. While on such a visa, a guest worker 
who wishes to quit their employer must leave the United States and apply for a new visa 
sponsored by a new employer if they wish to stay in compliance with immigration law. This 
general threat of “loss of status” (or permission to stay lawfully in the U.S.) combined with fear 
of loss of employment, gives employers of guest workers greater power over these workers than 
over a typical worker on account of reduced ability to separate from employment. 
Most visas do allow guest workers to obtain a new job by receiving sponsorship from 
another employer. As part of the process, however, there are many institutional frictions faced by 
both the employee and employer alike. Due to barriers to firms sponsoring guest workers 
(additional visa costs, paperwork, political/reputational costs), the market to hire guest workers is 
not as broad as the overall labor market. An employer who wishes to hire guest workers already 
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in the U.S. must undergo both a typical recruitment and hiring process with its attendant HR 
costs, as well as a change of employer process that carries additional costs for the employer. For 
the H-1B program, visa costs are often a 75% increase over the baseline cost of filling a job 
vacancy for a skilled professional.41 Consider the process as it applies to each of the H visas.42 
Any employer that seeks to hire  guest workers, be they new entrants to the U.S. or already 
employed as guest workers elsewhere in the economy, must first obtain a LCA from the 
Department of Labor’s (DOL) Education and Training Administration Office of Foreign Labor 
Certification (OFLC). While the DOL does not charge a fee, the paperwork burden includes an 
employer’s time searching for the accurate occupational classification43 and the correct 
prevailing or minimum wage, as well as a legal attestation that the information provided by the 
employer is accurate and that they are experiencing shortages.44 Employers can be prosecuted 
both civilly and criminally for willfully misrepresenting information on the petitions under 20 
CFR § 656.31(a).  
The needed paperwork under the LCA process is estimated to have a burden of 1-2 hours 
to complete. After the DOL approves an LCA, an employer must file an I-129 form for a specific 
worker with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Costs for the H-1B 
program can be quite high as there are additional fees to combat fraud and to fund education for 
U.S. workers. Fees add up if the employer is large, is a H-1B dependent employer, or is seeking 
                                                
41	See DNS, supra, at 4, citing Dube et al., Employee Replacement Costs, IRLE Working Paper 201-10, (2010).	
42	The H-1B for specialized workers such as computer programmers, the H-2A, for agricultural workers, and the H-
2B, for seasonal workers.	
43 The OFLC currently uses the Standard Occupational Classification or SOC code. 
44 Contra this, employers are more likely to claim they are experiencing shortages when unemployment is higher. 
See Ben A. Rissing & Emilio J. Castilla, Testing Attestations: U.S. Unemployment and Immigrant Work 
Authorizations, ILR Review, 69(5), 1081–1113 (2016). 
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an expedited approval.45 The last step is for an employee to schedule an appointment with a U.S. 
embassy or consulate, and take the necessary actions to obtain a visa. There are substantial 
opportunity and logistical costs associated with each step in the process. To compare the readily 
quantifiable institutional frictions between visas, we standardize costs in Table 1 using an $120 
per hour estimate of billing rates for a paralegal46 for all paperwork.47  
Table 1 - Summary Costs of Institutional Frictions 
Visa 
Step 1 – Obtain 
LCA 
Step 2 – Obtain USCIS 
I-129 
Step 3 – Obtain 
Visa Cost Estimate 
Fees Time Fees Time Fees Time 
H-2A - 1 hour $460 4.26 hours $160 1.25 
hours 
$1,401 
H-2B - 1.92  
hours 
$460 4.26 hours $160 1.25 
hours 
$1,512 












Table 1 demonstrates that guest worker programs incorporate additional paperwork 
burdens compared to the rest of the labor market. Along with the reforms of AC21, some 
regulations on job mobility were lessened, such as the earlier requirement that guest workers 
wait for government approval to switch jobs. As Sen. Hatch described: “The Committee further 
                                                
45 Under the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, an employer with under 25 employees and certain conditions 
must pay an additional $750, and an employer with 26 ore more employees must pay an additional $1,500. An 
expedited visa costs $1,000 additional. Under Pub. L. 111-230 (2010), firms with more than 50 employees and 
more than 50% of their workforce on visas must pay an additional fee of $2,000. This was increased under 
Pub. L. 114-113 (2015) to $4,000. This fee must also be paid at the time of change of status. 
46 We calculate the cost of the paperwork burden using the average regional billing rates of a paralegal in 2016. See, 
National Association of Legal Assistants, National Utilization & Compensation Survey Report, (2016). 
47 The Department of Labor has 3 separate forms, for the H-2A, ETA 9142A, for the H-2B, ETA 9142B, for the H-
1B, ETA 9035. See: https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/form.cfm.  The USCIS form is the I-129: 
https://www.uscis.gov/forms/h-and-l-filing-fees-form-i-129-petition-nonimmigrant-worker. For the State 




facilitated this flexibility in S. 2045 by allowing an H-1B employee to change employers at the 
time a new employer files the initial paperwork, rather than requiring the employee to wait for 
the new H-1B application to be approved.”48 Still, remaining institutional frictions limit the labor 
market through larger switching costs and a potentially thinner labor market.  
For example, some visas are given for an initial period and can be extended once for the 
same duration. In the case of the H-1B,  upon renewal of the initial three-year visa, there is a 
spike in quits  due to guest workers seeking better firms.49 This is consistent with workers 
avoiding job search until after their visa renewal, and thus staying with bad employers because of 
these frictions. In other cases, visas are given either for a short period or an initial period 
determined on an individual basis. For the H-2A visa, for example, the maximum duration is one 
year, but the approved duration could be the harvest season for a particular region and crop. Such 
short periods could also restrict the number of employers willing to hire a guest worker.  
2. Abuses and Lawsuits  
 To identify the visas of concern and the types of abuses seen in the programs, we 
searched for lawsuits and law review articles involving guest worker abuses.50 Across guest 
worker programs, abuse allegations range from conditions of indentured servitude to 
commonplace wage theft and poor working conditions. Guest workers are often subjected to 
fraudulent and coercive recruitment in their home country, followed by wage theft, safety 
violations, poor living conditions, intimidation and retaliation by an employer that is often no 
                                                
48 See Hatch, supra. 
49 See DNS, at 9. 
50 We iteratively searched Lexis-Nexis for terms “guest worker,” both with and without labor and employment law 
filters, and “foreign worker,” and by using Nexis headnotes that allow for filtering all cases under the label “Types 
of Nonimmigrant Visa.” This search resulted 163 relevant federal lawsuits since 1990, the year of the last major 
legislative update of many of these nonimmigrant programs. In addition, 48 relevant law review articles written 
since 2013 were examined. Relevant cases and law articles were coded to learn about the types of abuse occurring in 
each program, as well as the number of issues in each program.  
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more than a labor market intermediary.51 Several noteworthy articles include criticisms of the J-1 
visa program that sponsors au pairs and domestic workers,52 the H-1B program for computer 
professionals,53 the H-2A program for agricultural workers,54 and the H-2B program for 
temporary seasonal workers.55 For workers trapped in these situations, a lack of protection from 
retaliatory practices and incentives for reporting has left employers unaccountable.56  
To examine complaints regarding guest worker programs, we coded the legal basis for 
complaints in lawsuits against employers of guest workers. For example, any complaint that 
alleged underpayment of promised wages was coded as a “wage and hour” complaint, and any 
complaint involving sexual harassment was coded “discrimination.” We also coded fraud, 
trafficking, and antitrust claims.57 Figure 1 summarizes the visas and the specific complaints 
contained in guest worker related lawsuits since 1990. This illustrates a diverse set of abuses 
concentrated in a small number of guest worker visa programs. While law articles tend to address 
problems with multiple visas, most of the lawsuits are filed with respect to the H-1B, H-2A, or 
                                                
51 See Lucy Benz-Rogers, Relief for Guestworkers: Employer Perjury as a Qualifying Crime for U Visa Petitions, 42 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 193 (2014); Jennifer Gordon, Regulating the Human Supply Chain, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 445 (2016). 
52 See Janie A. Chuang, The US Au Pair Program: Labor Exploitation and the Myth of Cultural Exchange. Harv. JL 
& Gender, 36, 269 (2013). 
53 See Matloff, supra. 
54 See Lisa Guerra, Modern-Day Servitude: A Look at the H-2A Program's Purposes, Regulations, and Realities, 29 
Vt. L. Rev. 185 (2004). 
55 See Bryce W. Ashby, Indentured Guests-How the H-2A and H-2B Temporary Guest Worker Programs Create the 
Conditions for Indentured Servitude and Why Upfront Reimbursement for Guest Workers' Transportation, Visa, and 
Recruitment Costs is the Solution. U. Mem. L. Rev., 38, 893 (2007). 
56 See Elizabeth Lincoln, Accountability for Pesticide Poisoning of Undocumented Farmworkers, 24 Hastings W.-
N.W. J. Env. L. & Pol'y 383 (2018).	
57 For coding purposes, discrimination claims include all complaints brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
and relate to discrimination on the basis of national origin, race, and sex, including sexual harassment and hostile 
work environments. Fraud claims and conspiracy to commit fraud claims brought under the Racketeering Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act related to false employer claims made in documentation either provided to 
the workers at the time of recruitment, or to the government when acquiring visas. Trafficking claims related to 
violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), and in one case, the Thirteenth Amendment, which 
bans slavery and indentured servitude, including debt peonage. Trafficking claims often involve employers seizing 
workers’ passports to prevent employees’ ability to return home, as well as false imprisonment and curtailing 
workers’ ability to move freely outside of a labor camp or worksite (including ambassadors’ residences in several 
cases). 
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the H-2B program. This makes sense, as the H-2A program for agricultural workers, the H-2B 
program for non-agricultural workers, and the H-1B program for specialty occupations are 
among the largest guest worker programs.58   
 
Figure 1 - Federal Claims Brought in Guest Worker Cases 1990-2017 
 
 
The number of allegations (193) depicted in Figure 1 is greater than the number of cases 
(163), as a single court matter often involves claims of violations of multiple laws. In reviewing 
complaints included in the lawsuits, the most common allegation involved wage and hour claims 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act or the Migrant and Agricultural Workers Protection Act.59 
                                                
58 See Costa & Rosenbaum, supra. The J-1 program for exchange visitors and the F-1 program for foreign students 
who wish to work following degree completion are larger than the H programs, yet attract fewer lawsuits, perhaps 
because their emphasis is on cultural exchange rather than work, although this has attracted notable criticism (see, 
e.g. Chuang, supra).  
59 Worker protections in the guest worker programs include a requirement that employers pay guest workers a 
minimum rate. Wage and hour claims arise when workers are paid less than the minimum wage, less than the 
required wage (the prevailing or adverse effect wage rate, depending upon the program), less than a labor condition 
application stated, or when workers face illegal deductions for recruitment / travel costs, housing, or denial of pay 
stubs, timely pay, and overtime. After wage and hour violations, the most common complaints brought regarding 
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One hundred eleven of these complaints arose under the H-2A and H-2B programs. While 
antitrust cases brought by guest workers appear to be small in number, this may in part be due to 
the structure of the programs that require employers to pay guest workers at least a minimum 
rate. In Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351 1981, when migrant fruit workers alleged 
discriminatory wages, the Court ruled against them and granted limited antitrust immunity to 
fruit grower defendants because the DOL is authorized to regulate wage rates for H-2A workers. 
Two recent antitrust lawsuits brought by guest workers, and legal commentary, have invigorated 
the discussion of guest workers and antitrust concerns.  
3. Oligopsony and Antitrust Law  
Two recent lawsuits, one permitted to proceed and one rejected by the courts, include 
antitrust claims brought on behalf of guest workers. These lawsuits allege that two or more 
oligopsonistic employers colluded with one another in order to illegally suppress guest worker 
wages.  In one recent antitrust lawsuit, Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23940, plaintiffs represent a class of all au pairs on J-1 visas. The suit claims that sixteen 
defendant companies, which represent 100% of the sponsors of au pairs, conspired to fix wages 
at an artificially low floor, to prevent wage competition. Plaintiffs allege that the companies 
committed price fixing and misrepresented actual wages of au pairs in recruitment materials and 
advertisements. In this case, plaintiffs hired an investigator who was told by representatives of 
the sponsors that they had agreed to keep au pair wages as low as possible. This “smoking gun” 
proved essential for the plaintiffs. While the court decided the evidence was “weak,” the case 
was allowed to go forward due to the combination of circumstantial factors and the limited 
available evidence.  
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In the second case, Llacua v. Western Range Ass'n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193120, the 
plaintiffs were five Peruvian sheepherders who were recruited on H-2A visas and paid the 
minimum DOL-set wage floor at five different ranches. The sheepherders sued the five ranchers, 
as well as the Western Range Association (WRA), and the Mountain Plains Agricultural Service 
(MPAS) under antitrust law. The ranchers had hired the WRA and the MPAS to represent them 
in recruiting and employing foreign-born sheepherders and offered standard wages to the 
workers. Despite the evidence that the ranches used a common agent to sponsor guest workers, 
because the plaintiffs offered no specific evidence of conspiracy to fix wages in the Llacua case, 
the Court held that “the conspiracy is not plausible if in light of common economic experience 
the alleged conduct is equally likely to result from independent action.”  
In order to succeed in an antitrust matter, plaintiffs must show evidence of a conspiracy 
“from an agreement,” not merely from the “independent decisions” of individual businesses.60 
Regardless of the legal bar for proving a case, both unlawful collusion and independent decisions 
can create a monopsonistic effect of depressing a worker’s wages below their value to the firm. 
To protect citizens and guest workers, the H-1B and H-2B programs require employers to pay 
the prevailing wage in the specific occupation in which the worker is employed. Protections such 
as these prevailing wage requirements for workers might serve as an effective check on market 
power and enhance welfare, as a well-designed wage regulation in a monopsonistic labor market 
raises both employment levels and wages. However, for many years the regulations gave 
employers the right to select the survey, occupation and experience level. This may allow 
employers to still exercise their monopsony power by giving them the ability to define the 
                                                
60 See Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929, (2007). 
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market.61,62 Thus, the degree to which employers are able to exercise this power is an empirical 
question, and our analysis will shed some light on this. 
 As a further example of potential actions that allow for the exercise of monopsony power 
without violating the law, Lee states in connection with monopsony power and the H-2A and H-
2B program: “employers can essentially price-fix a suboptimal wage for these jobs so they will 
attract few U.S. workers.”63 Under the H-2A program, the wage floor is the Adverse Effect 
Wage Rate or the “‘annual weighted average hourly wage rate’ for field and livestock workers 
for the region obtained from the annual Farm Labor Survey conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.” Lee argues that because 50-70% of agricultural workers are undocumented, 
employers can suppress wages prior to survey administration by employing non-native workers 
to be included in the survey.  
Beltran and Llacua illustrate how collusion among employers has been very difficult to 
prove in the absence of a “smoking gun.” In contrast, enhanced antitrust scrutiny is merited and 
may be more effective when markets clearly display circumstantial evidence of monopsony 
power and a “smoking gun” is absent. This suggests an important role for Industrial Organization 
Economists and Labor Economists to examine such markets with quantitative methods to better 
identify places where anti-competitive outcomes may be occurring, and where antitrust oversight 
may be most important. In the following section, we perform such an analysis of three guest 
                                                
61 See Maria L. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, Outsourcing and Body Shops: A Continuum of Exploitation for High Tech 
Workers, 38 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 (2017). 
62 While employers still face the choice of the level and occupation of their guest workers, the H-1B Visa Reform 
Act of 2004 provided a good faith compliance defense to employers that use the recognized industry standard wage 
survey to identify the prevailing wage. For this reason, the choice of survey now largely defaults to the use of the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Survey. 
63 See Jennifer J. Lee, U.S. Workers Need Not Apply: Challenging Low-Wage Guest Worker Programs, 28 Stan. L. 
& Pol'y Rev 1 (2017). 
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worker programs to determine if it would be possible to make a prima facie case that oligopsony 
is a cause for concern. 
 
II. EVIDENCE OF OLIGOPSONY AND FRICTIONS IN GUEST WORKER WAGES  
This section presents results from our analysis of the degree of imperfection in three 
guest worker visa programs. Given the abuses in guest worker programs, we seek to address two 
fundamental questions. First, we seek to establish whether guest worker labor markets are highly 
concentrated. If guest worker labor markets show no signs of concentration, then antitrust law 
has little relevance, and guest workers work in occupations and places where there is ample 
competition among employers for workers. If there is evidence of concentration, then it is 
necessary to pose a second question: could concentration lower guest worker wages? If 
concentration is unrelated to wages, then this suggests that firms cannot exercise their 
oligopsonistic power to set wages. In Section A below, we first describe the construction of the 
dataset used in the analysis in detail, then proceed in Sections B and C to the two questions 
posed above, and finally, in Section D, to estimate the relative importance of oligopsony and 
frictions as influences on guest worker wages. 
A. Data Construction  
As documented above, the H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B visa programs attract the largest 
number of complaints and represent a large share of granted visas. From a process perspective, 
all three programs require that employers apply for a Labor Condition Application (LCA) from 
the Department of Labor (DOL) prior to petitioning for a visa. The LCA process creates a record 
of every application by an employer for a guest worker visa, and despite some limitations, can 
serve as a good proxy for firm-level demand for guest workers. 
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For our analysis, we use annual LCA disclosure data from the DOL’s Education and 
Training Administration Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC) to analyze employer-
specific wages and program-specific concentration ratios. The OFLC makes raw data publicly 
available from its website.64 The OFLC has responsibility over several of the largest non-
immigrant guest worker programs including the H-2A, H-2B, and H-1B. Data on H-1B workers 
with a college degree in “specialty occupations” is available for fiscal years 2001 to 2017, the H-
2B data for non-agricultural temporary workers is available from 2000 to 2017, and the H-2A 
program data for agricultural workers is available from 2006 to 2017. 
The data requires extensive cleaning. We clean the data and create single files that 
consistently capture the following variables across programs and years as reported by the 
employer: employer name, dates (start and end), employer state65 and zip code, minimum legally 
mandated wage, lowest wage promised to be paid to employee, and job title and occupation of 
                                                
64 See https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm and FLCDataCenter.com. 
65	Our baseline geographic definition of the labor market at the state level is generally broader than for other papers 
in this literature, though our population of workers is also different. One concern may be that even a state level 
definition of a labor market may be too broad for guest workers; if these individuals were willing to uproot their 
lives and move potentially thousands of miles from home in search of better job opportunities, it seems plausible 
that they might also be much more likely than native born workers to move within the United States to further 
improve their lot. While we do not have demographic data on the individual guest workers who may be filling the 
LCA data that we examine, we are able to provide some justification for our market definition with an analysis of 
survey data. We use the 2005-2017 American Community Survey, which contains individual level data on interstate 
mobility. Here, we employ observations for over 22 million individuals age 18 to 65 (inclusively) who lived in the 
United States the year before the survey. We find evidence that foreign born individuals are actually less mobile 
than native born workers overall, even after including a broad set of controls including a quadratic of age indicators 
for educational attainment level, marital status, and the year and state of the current residence for each observation. 
There is heterogeneity in these relative mobility patterns by level of education. When examining individuals with 
less than a high school education, raw annual interstate mobility rates are 1.25% for the foreign born, as compared to 
1.88% for native born individuals, with the mobility difference being statistically significantly lower for the foreign 
born when including the above-mentioned controls. The reverse is true for college educated workers, with raw 
mobility rates being 3.27% for the overall population, and 3.34% and 3.25% for the foreign- and native-born 
populations, respectively. Once including the above controls, we find a statistically significant 0.3 percentage point 
higher rate of mobility among the foreign born which corresponds to these individuals being about 10% more likely 
to move over the overall baseline. Generally, the fact that over 96% of even college educated workers remain in the 
same state from one year to the next helps to provide some justification for considering this to be a relevant market. 
Because zip code data is available, in some specifications for H-1B workers, we also consider a narrower definitions 
of the geographic labor market, namely commuting zones. See infra, at 78.	
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worker. Crucially, we only observe data on potential jobs in the form of certified LCAs; we do 
not know whether all of these jobs were filled (or even posted). However, to some extent the 
nature of this data mirrors best practices in this literature: it is the existence of new potential job 
options, and the corresponding degree of concentration of these jobs among potential new 
employers, which likely best describes market concentration from the perspective of a worker 
seeking to improve their lot, rather than the distribution of existing jobs.66   
In our raw data, occupational coding is based on two different classification methods. 
The Dictionary of Occupation Titles (DOT) is used for occupational coding in the years 2001-
2009. After 2009, occupations are coded primarily using 2010 Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) codes. For consistency in occupational measurement, we crosswalk DOT 3-
digit occupations to 2-digit SOC codes.67 The relationship between the 3-digit DOT level and the 
2-digit SOC level is not a 1:1 mapping. To obtain the most consistent mapping, we allocate 3-
digit DOT codes to a 2-digit SOC if a 2-digit code was the predominant 1:1 mapping at the 6-
digit level.68 For example, if there are three unique 3-digit (6-digit) DOT codes and two of the 
three mapped to a 2-digit SOC code of 17, then all three are coded as 17. 
The occupations of guest workers vary significantly across programs. We examine the 22 
civilian occupations as defined by the SOC Codes “Major Group” (two-digit) definitions. This 
level of aggregation is justified by low rates of mobility between occupations at this level. Only 
around 8% of non-citizen workers who underwent a change in employment status also 
                                                
66 See discussion infra, at footnotes 74-75.  
67 We crosswalk DOT occupational codes to SOC occupational codes using a crosswalk supplied by O*NET 
(https://www.onetcenter.org/crosswalks.html). 
68 DOT coding has the following form, XXX.XXX-XXX. A 3-digit designation is the first three digits of an 
occupation code. The SOC has the following coding form, XX-XXXX.XX. A 2-digit aggregation is denoted by all 
occupation codes that share the same first two digits. Aggregation of SOC codes at the 2-digit level is also known as 
aggregating occupations at the “Major Group” level. 
 29 
transitioned between different occupations under this definition annually.69 Furthermore, the top 
five and top seven occupations account for over 90% of certified LCAs for H-1B and H-2B 
workers, respectively. We present the relative frequency of the most common occupations for 
each of these visa programs in Table 2. The lack of overlap between these occupations 
underscores the different nature of these programs. In addition, it is worthwhile to note that guest 
workers are much more concentrated in a narrow set of occupations relative to the general 
population, as would be expected given that guest workers visas are awarded in only specific 
occupations. Note that given the nature of the H-2A program, we code all certified LCAs in this 
program to Farming, Fishing and Forestry Occupations (45). 
Table 2 - Top Occupations in H-1B and H-2B Data 
H-1B H-2B 
Occupation and SOC Code Percent Occupation and SOC Code Percent 
Computer and Mathematical (15) 35% Building and Grounds Cleaning 
and Maintenance (37)  
44% 
Architecture and Engineering (17) 15% Production (51) 12% 
Business and Financial Operations 
(13) 
13% Construction and Extraction (47) 10% 
Management (11) 10% Food Preparation and Serving 
Related (35) 
9% 
Life, Physical, and Social Science 
(19) 
9% Protective Service (33) 7% 
Healthcare Practitioners and 
Technical (29) 
8% Farming, Fishing and Forestry (45) 6% 
Education, Training, and Library 
(25) 
5% Personal Care and Service (39) 5% 
 
 
                                                
69 We use 2006-2016 monthly data for non-citizens aged between 18 and 65 (inclusive), and code current and 
previous occupations for workers who experienced a break in employment during the period of study. See Sarah 
Flood et al. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 6.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, 
MN: IPUMS (2018). https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V6.0 
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Despite the difficulty working with LCA data, a number of previously published studies 
have used this data.70 As stated above, one disadvantage of the data is that not all approved 
applications correspond to actual hiring. Such data is publicly available from United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). However, USCIS data also has limitations: 
occupation data is missing and is only available for a limited number of years, and with the 
number of workers hired often censored.71 Our preference for the LCA data stems primarily from 
the fact that it comes with administrative data on the occupation, which is an important part of 
the definition of the relevant market.   
There are several decisions made in creating the LCA data that require the exercise of 
judgment and the use of caution in interpretation. In cleaning the raw data, we drop a number of 
observations due to inconsistencies that make the data difficult to import. We discard all 
applications rejected by the OFLC, thus restricting our use to only applications that are certified. 
After these steps, we are able to retain 94% of the observations in the raw H-1B data, 96% of the 
raw observations in the H-2A data, and 78% of the raw observations in the H-2B data. We also 
address the problem of typographical errors and reduce bias due to outliers in the wage data by 
winsorizing the dataset in the following ways: we replace the top and bottom 5% of wage values 
in the H-1B, H-2A and H-2B data within years with the 95th and 5th percentile, respectively. We 
also winsorize the number of guest workers sponsored by a given firm at the 99th and 1st 
                                                
70 See e.g., Madeline Zavodny. The H-1B Program and its Effects on Information Technology Workers. Economic 
Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 88(3), 33-44, (2003). William R. Kerr & William F. Lincoln, The Supply 
Side of Innovation: H-1B Visa Reforms and US Ethnic Invention, Journal of Labor Economics, 28(3), 473-508, 
(2010). Gaurav Khanna & Munseob Lee, High-Skill Immigration, Innovation, and Creative Destruction. In Ganguli 
et al., supra. 
71 In its report on guest worker programs, GAO, supra, the GAO recommended DOL and USCIS share data to better 
identify potential abusers of the program. 
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percentile.72 We inflate all wage data to 2018 prices using the Consumer Price Index. We then 
manually inspect and correct firm names for at least the largest 5% of firms in each program.  In 
doing so, we reduced the chances that a firm entered with various spellings will be 
inappropriately captured more than once in the data.  
Further interpretive caution is in order. First, weighted results are meant to represent the 
average worker’s experience of the labor market, but in the case of intermediary firms, the 
weighted results, in particular, may be skewed by a difference between the observed employer of 
record’s location and the location of the employee.73 To address this, we calculated the ratio of 
the largest firm (in terms of employment of guest workers) to the median firm in each market 
and dropped the most skewed one percent of markets.74 As the preliminary step in the process of 
hiring guest workers, it is possible that an employer either obtains more permissions than 
necessary or decides to cease the process at a later stage. Ex-ante, it is not clear whether this data 
would show evidence of more or less market concentration than equivalent data on the number 
of workers actually hired; this would depend upon how the distribution of unfilled jobs varies 
with a firm’s size in this labor market. Therefore, an HHI obtained from the LCA data may better 
represent the degree of competitiveness in a labor market: the key characteristic of labor market 
competition from the perspective of the worker looking for a new job is the number of outside 
                                                
72 Winsorization replaces rather than removes potential outliers with a maximum or minimum value, and thus 
reduces bias in estimates toward the extremes. See Webber, supra for another use of winsorization to address similar 
challenges.	
73 For example, the weighted results at the commuting zone level for the H-1B program appeared to be driven by a 
small number of commuting zones with a large number of workers. We found this was due to a few cases in which a 
single firm reported sponsoring an extremely high number of guest workers while using their zip code as the 
reported work location. Such firms could be readily identified as international labor market intermediaries, see, 
Peter Norlander & Arup Varma, H-1B and L-1 Visa Sponsored Guest Workers in the USA: An Analysis of the 
Strategic Impact of Indian and Other Firms, Thunderbird International Business Review, (forthcoming). 	
74 This had little or no impact on the state-level analysis, as the most skewed markets were in nearly all cases at the 
commuting zone level.  
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options which are available. Other works use similar approaches when examining concentration 
and wages.75 
B. Are Guest Worker Labor Markets Oligopsonistic?  
The Department of Justice (DOJ) applies a standard methodology to analyzing the facts 
regarding the potential antitrust implications of a merger.76 We follow Azar et al. in using these 
guidelines to study labor markets and perform the first in-depth examination of concentration in 
the guest worker programs, as well as one of a handful of studies of how concentration, at the 
occupational level, correlates with wages.77 We report in Table 3 summary statistics for each 
guest worker program, including the mean and standard deviation for the HHI, number of firms, 
and wage including both unweighted and weighted averages. From this table, it is possible to see 
that in both the H-2B and the H-1B programs, the average market (or the unweighted) HHI is 
greater than the DOJ’s concentration threshold, and that the average worker (weighted) also 
faces a market that meets the DOJ’s threshold. It is also noteworthy that the average number of 
firms in a market suggests a higher level of competition than does the HHI, consistent with a 
market structure of one or two dominant firms and a competitive fringe of a large number of 
small firms. We are able to construct this measure for far more markets for the H-2B visa than 
the H-1A visa (in large part on account of the H-2B visa serving multiple two-digit occupations). 
The H-1B visa provides even more data, especially when we extend our analysis to the 
                                                
75 See, Azar et al., supra.  
76 These definitions of concentration are given in Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra. Previous definitions of 
Moderate Concentrated and Highly Concentrated were 1000 and 1800, respectively in the 1982, 1984, 1992 and 
1997 versions of the guidelines. See, Department of Justice, AntiTrust Division, Merger Enforcement, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/merger-enforcement. 
77 See, Azar et al., supra; Pedro S. Martins, Making Their Own Weather? Estimating Employer Labour-Market 
Power And Its Wage Effects, CGR Working Paper 95 (2018); Alan Kwan & Yukun Liu, Labor Market Power and 
Firm Financial Flexibility, SSRN Working Paper (2018).	
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commuting zone level. H-1B workers are generally much higher paid than workers under either 
of the H-2 programs. 
We present our calculations of HHIs for various labor markets in Figure 2. The Figure is 
arranged into four columns, which display data (from left to right) on the H-2A, H-2B, and H-1B 
visa programs. For the H-1B program, on which we have significantly more data, we present the 
results of analysis at both the state and commuting zone level.78 The top row in the figure 
presents average HHI values, while the bottom row displays data on the share of markets that 
would meet a threshold of concentration (1500 or above, according to DOJ standards). We 
present results using a state-level analysis of a labor market. To the best of our knowledge, no 
papers exploring market concentration and wages in the recent literature have used any measures 
broader than state. Thus, if our measures of concentration are prone to bias, they are likely 
underestimating the degree of concentration. 
 
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics 
    Unweighted Weighted   
    Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. N 
H-2A, 
State 
HHI 1368 1880 649 851 601 
Wage  $22,603.19   $2,959.59   $22,233.42   $2,641.25  601 
Number of Firms 123 163 299 263 601 
H-2B, 
State 
HHI 5379 3612 1505 2151 7127 
Wage  $29,161.58   $18,194.98   $27,328.06   $15,067.12  7127 
Number of Firms 12 31 82 93 7127 
H-1B, 
State 
HHI 3112 3369 1846 2309 11614 
Wage  $66,202.21   $19,215.02   $77,488.13   $11,550.98  11614 
Number of Firms 132 407 1795 1765 11614 
H-1B, 
CZ 
HHI 5802 3637 1467 2104 56802 
Wage  $68,977.62   $26,395.94   $75,494.52   $15,148.29  56802 
                                                
78 Commuting zones are interrelated geographic areas with respect to labor markets. Commuting zones combine 
county boundaries that representing geographical markets between employers and employees. 
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Figure 2 - Employer Concentration Levels (HHI) for H-2A, H-2B, and H-1B Visas
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In the top left panel of Figure 2, we examine concentration in the market for H-2A workers. 
For workers on this visa, we consider all farm work to fall under one specific two-digit 
occupational code. The results suggest that the average market is near the threshold for 
concentration. In the panel to the right, we weight these estimates such that the HHI represents 
the level of concentration faced by the average worker (proxied for by the number of approved 
LCA jobs in that category), rather than the level of concentration in the average market. Here, we 
see that the average worker does not face such concentration in their labor market.  
Examining the figure for average HHIs for the H-2B program, in the second leftmost panel of 
the figure we see that the average market is generally below the threshold for concentration when 
we treat all jobs as perfect substitutes (“All Occs”). On the other hand, when we segment labor 
markets based on the 1-digit “High-Level Aggregation” (5 civilian occupations), or 2-digit 
“Major Group Level” (22 civilian occupations) aggregations, the HHI is typically above 2500, 
the cutoff for “highly concentrated.” The weighted average reveals HHIs close to the 
concentration threshold for our 2-digit analysis. We find similar results when examining the H-
2B program at the state-level, and starker differences between weighted and un-weighted 
estimates in our commuting zone analysis.  
In the bottom row of the figures, we turn to an examination of the share of markets (left 
panel) or jobs (right panel) that are in concentrated labor markets. These numbers are again quite 
low for the H-2A visas. Here, we dispense with analysis treating all jobs as perfect substitutes 
and instead focus on only the 1-digit and 2-digit occupation levels for the H-2B and H-1B visas. 
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Using either definition, we observe that over half of all H-2B and H-1B markets are 
characterized by an HHI representing at least moderate degrees of concentration.79  
Before summing up this analysis, it is worthwhile to note that even if the typical dollar spent 
by a consumer on a final good is not spent in a concentrated market, this does not suggest that 
there is no role for antitrust policy. Rather, antitrust policy in output markets concentrates on 
those markets in which there is significant concentration because of the effects this has on other 
markets. Thus, our estimates suggest that even though a typical worker may not face a moderate 
or high concentration of employers, there may still be some role for antitrust policy in particular 
markets. Even if the experience of a typical worker is that of employment in a well-functioning 
labor market, some of the labor markets face heavy concentration from the vantage point of 
output market merger scrutiny standards. 
As such, these results do suggest a role for increased antitrust scrutiny of particular markets, 
if not all markets. The intensity of such scrutiny is at the end of the day a function of the 
definition of the market. Further study of the degree of mobility for these workers between 
occupations and between states or commuting zones (as well as to other non-H-1B sponsoring 
employers) could shed further light on the relevant definition of a market. In the next section, we 
turn our attention to an exploration of what forms increased scrutiny of concentrated markets 
may take. 
C. Does Oligopsony Lower Wages?  
We now turn to our next piece of analysis: an examination of the relationship between 
wages and the HHI values in the markets that we have examined. Recall that our data contains 
                                                
79 In Appendix A Figures 1-6, we show how these numbers break down by “Moderate” or “High” Concentration for 
H-1B and H-2B visas.  
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information on the approved minimum wages to be paid for a certified LCA application. Table 4 
presents estimates from regressions of the average log wage in a labor market (2-digit 
occupation, state or commuting zone) on a cubic of the HHI in that labor market. Controls 
include year, geographic (state or commuting zone) and occupation (H-1B and H-2B estimations 
only) fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the geographic level. The table presents 
the average HHI (weighted and unweighted), and the corresponding marginal effect of additional 
labor market concentration (with the HHI scaled between 0 and 1) and standard error on this 
estimate. We also present a “Pure Monopsony Effect” displaying how a move from perfect 
competition to pure monopsony, along with the standard error on this estimate. In addition, we 
display the p-value from a test of joint significance on each of the polynomial terms, along with 
the number of observations in the regression.  
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Table 4 - Regression Analysis 
	
 H-2A State H-2B State H-1B State H-1B CZ 
 Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
HHI Bar 1.3678 1.3678 0.5379 0.5379 0.3112 0.3112 0.5802 0.5802 
Marginal Effect at HHI 
Bar -0.0049 -0.007 -0.206 -0.6051 -0.264 -0.4624 -0.2607 0.0273 
 (0.0228) (0.0218) (0.1298) (0.1614) (0.1066) (0.1464) (0.0531) (0.1654) 
HHI W-Bar 0.649 0.649 0.1505 0.1505 0.1846 0.1846 0.1467 0.1467 
Marginal Effect at HHI 
W-Bar -0.0086 0.038 -0.2078 -0.4523 -0.306 -0.4719 -0.3547 0.0662 
 (0.0284) (0.0208) (0.1492) (0.1723) (0.1108) (0.1231) (0.0655) (0.1531) 
Pure Monopsony Effect 0.033 0.4513 -0.0687 -0.1275 -0.0902 -0.0689 -0.1336 -0.0662 
 (0.0858) (0.4729) (0.0229) (0.0327) (0.0226) (0.0361) (0.0119) (0.0393) 
P-Value on F on Cubic 0.686 0.2018 0.0177 0.0001 0.0003 0 0 0.0229 
N 601 601 7127 7127 11614 11614 56802 56802 
This table presents a state level estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 2-digit occupation (for H-1B and H-2B; H-2A contains only one occupation) 
controls, and a battery of year, occupation, and state fixed effects. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and state level labor market, 
and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a guest worker (HHI W-Bar is weighted by the number of employees requested in a certified 
Labor Condition Application). Unweighted and Weighted columns indicate whether or not the regression is weighted based on the number of guest workers. 
Standard Errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the State or Commuting Zone level. 
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The results in the first two columns show very little evidence of a relationship between 
wages and market concentration for the H-2A visa, though it should be noted that we observe 
only one occupation for the H-2A visa, and thus have only 601 observations. The next two 
columns present results of a similar analysis conducted on the H-2B visa, which corresponds to a 
number of different occupations as seen in Table 2. Here we find some evidence of an 
oligopsony effect on wages, as shown by p-values from the F-test on the cubic function of the 
HHI that allows us to reject a null hypothesis of joint insignificance. Specifically, we find that a 
move from perfect competition to pure monopsony is associated with a decline in wages of 
between 7 and 13 percent. In addition, our four estimates of the marginal effect of more 
concentration (at the average HHI) on wages are all negative, and significant in two cases. We 
find stronger evidence of an oligopsony effect with the H-1B visa at the state level. Here we 
reject the F test for joint insignificance of the cubic terms in both weighted and unweighted 
regressions. The pure monopsony effects are both negative and significant, and range between 7 
and 9 percent. In addition, our four estimates of the marginal effect of more concentration (at the 
average HHI) on wages are all negative and significant.80 Finally, we examine evidence for the 
H-1B visa at the commuting zone level, finding stronger evidence in the unweighted regressions 
compared to the weighted regressions. We reject the F test in both cases but only find significant 
wage effects in the unweighted regressions, consistent with the largest markets being outliers as 
discussed earlier in the section. 
                                                
80 For our state-level analysis, we experiment with interacted fixed effects (i.e. fixed effects at the occupational 
crossed with state level, occupation crossed with year level, and state cross with year level). These results are 
displayed in Appendix B - Tables 9 and 10. As can be seen in the 6th through 8th columns, the results generated by 
these models are qualitatively similar, though smaller when using occupation and geographic interactions for fixed 
effects. To ease computational burden, we conduct our commuting zone analysis without these interacted fixed 
effects. 
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We further examine the above results in Figure 3, where we plot the estimated cubic 
functions from the regression results reported in Table 3. The vertical lines displayed in each 
figure denote the 25th and 75th percentile of market concentration. The left panel of the figure 
displays results from our unweighted regression, while the right panel displays the weighted 
results. The figure allows us to identify the non-linear relationship between concentration and 
wages more easily. In the H-2A panel in Figure 3, we see that a lack of precision, likely on 
account of the smaller amount of data available for this visa program, prohibits us from making 
any clear conclusions about a relationship between HHI and wages regarding this visa.  
Figure 3 - Oligopsony on Wages 
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The bottom left panel on the H-2B visa displays some evidence of a negative correlation 
between wages and concentration for this visa, consistent with the results presented in Table 3. 
The right two panels display results on the H-1B visa for the state level (top right) and 
commuting zone level (bottom right) analysis. In our unweighted estimates, we observe a 
negative but diminishing effect with the commuting zone estimates which appear, in general, to 
be more precisely estimated. The weighted estimates display similar evidence consistent with 
more concentration leading to lower wages, though these models are less precisely estimated 
than their unweighted counterparts.  
To answer the question regarding the link between oligopsony and wages posed at the 
start of this section, we find consistent evidence that oligopsony is correlated with lower wages. 
Whether concentration and the use of oligopsony power causes lower wages requires further 
research with greater experimental or quasi-experimental analysis. However, given the data 
analysis conducted here, in combination with other economic evidence and theoretical modeling, 
it is possible to provide estimates of the role that frictions and oligopsony have in decreasing 
guest worker wages. 
D. Modeling the Role of Frictions and Oligopsony on Wages 
As we have discussed, labor markets can depart from perfect competition for two distinct 
reasons: market concentration and market frictions (both natural and institutional). The results 
presented in Table 3 and Figure 3 demonstrate evidence consistent with oligopsonistic market 
pressures: as market concentration increases, wages decrease. In Table 1 we documented the 
existence of institutional frictions that add to the cost of mobility and would theoretically be 
expected to decrease worker mobility.  
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In order to best understand how well this labor market functions, as well as how potential 
policy reforms could improve the functioning of this market, it is worthwhile to attempt to 
understand the relative importance of these two anti-competitive forces in the labor market. To 
undertake such an analysis, we turn to a model proposed by Naidu & Posner81 which expresses 
the elasticity of labor supply to an individual firm as a function of both labor market 
concentration as well as a monopsonistically competitive elasticity. The latter term expresses the 
degree of imperfect competition that would exist even when an infinite number of firms were 
competing for the same workers, and thus the corresponding HHI were zero.82 
In Figure 4 we present results from a simulation based on the model of Naidu & Posner, 
and compare them to our empirical results displaying the relationship between market 
concentration and wages.83 We use results from DNS on the elasticity of labor supply to the firm 
for guest workers in computer services occupations.84 We use our estimates of the HHI for 
workers in this industry in the years covered by the DNS data.85 With these two parameters, we 
can estimate the “competitive elasticity” for any given value of the aggregate elasticity of supply 
to the labor market. Naidu & Posner consider two values of the aggregate elasticity: 2.8 and .78. 
                                                
81 Naidu & Posner, supra. 
82 Specifically, they show that eta=1/((h/eta_agg) +(1/eta_comp)), where eta represents the elasticity of labor supply 
that an individual firm faces, h is HHI (indexed between 0 and 1), eta_agg is the elasticity of labor supply to the 
entire market, and eta_comp is the elasticity of labor supply to an individual firm even in the presence of 
competition between many different firms. This can be easily seen by setting h=0 and seeing that this implies that 
eta=eta_comp 
83 We choose to use our estimates for the entire set of H-1B occupations that we examine, rather than to run a new 
set of estimates limited only to computer professions given the importance of including occupational fixed effects. 
84 The DNS results are obtained from estimates on data from 2003 to 2011 which come from both H-1B and L-1 
visas. Here, we calculate the elasticity of labor supply to the firm as 1.74, multiplying the estimated quit elasticity 
found in DNS (-.872) at the average rate of unemployment in the data (7.89%) by -2, as per Manning, supra. We 
choose to treat the estimated return to India elasticity as irrelevant for this calculation as we believe that the vast 
majority of such returns are representative of involuntary separations, rather than voluntary quits for better 
employment opportunities. When we consider these to be voluntary quits, our results suggest a larger elasticity of 
labor supply to the firm and that firms would have the ability to markdown wages by less than 10% with no 
concentration and at an aggregate labor supply elasticity of 0.78. 
85 We choose to use the HHI faced by the average worker in this occupation, rather than the HHI in the average 
market, as the DNS results are implicitly weighted towards the elasticity for the average worker. 
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We consider values of the aggregate elasticity between 0 and 2.8, in increments of 0.01. We 
exclude values of the competitive elasticity which are either negative or smaller than the 
aggregate elasticity, or which imply a competitive elasticity larger than the average elasticity 
from DNS. 
Figure 4 displays how wages decrease, as compared to the monopsonistically competitive 
wage, as concentration increases. Our empirical results, corresponding to the unweighted 
regression results for the H-1B visa at the commuting zone level shown previously in Figure 3, 
are displayed in dashed lines, while the simulated results are displayed using solid lines. The 
lighter solid lines correspond to smaller assumed values of the elasticity of labor supply to the 
market, while the darker lines correspond to higher assumed values of this parameter. In the 
legend, we display the assumed aggregate supply elasticity and corresponding implied 
competitive elasticity for our smallest and largest assumed aggregate elasticity values that 
produce valid estimates of the competitive elasticity.  
What is clear from Figure 4 is that all of our simulations yield implied wage effects of 
market concentration which are stronger than what was estimated in our data. As mentioned 
above, Naidu & Posner consider two aggregate elasticity estimates from prior work: 2.8 and 
0.78. We find that 2.8 is not a feasible elasticity given our restrictions, and therefore consider the 
results at 0.78. This aggregate elasticity implies a monopsonistically competitive elasticity of 2.3. 
This further implies that a worker in a monopsonistically competitive market is paid 70% of their 
worth to the firm, suggesting a significant anti-competitive role for frictions in this market. In a 
pure monopsony (with an implied elasticity of 0.58) the worker is paid only 37% of their 
marginal revenue product. Thus, we would expect wages under monopsony to be 47% lower 
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than under monopsonistic competition. In contrast, our empirical results imply that pure 
monopsony firms only reduce wages by about 13% compared to a market with no concentration.  
This suggests that firms are not able to use all of their market power. In the right panel, 
we display these results when scaled to the average wage for H-1B guest workers in the years 
2003-2011. A horizontal line at $60,000 displays the minimum prevailing wage for H-1B 
dependent firms that wish to remain exempt from certain regulations.86 The empirical results 
obtained from the influence of HHI on wages suggests that the regulatory process of approving 
firms’ wages and a requirement that firms must pay the prevailing wage (or $60,000 if H-1B 
dependent), may have an effect of preventing this exercise of market power. Given a median 
prevailing wage of $66,304 in this data, in the absence of such regulations, the implied power of 
firms under the model suggests wages could be $10,000 to $40,000 lower than at present 
depending upon assumptions regarding the competitiveness of the aggregate labor market.  
Figure 4 - Predicted and Simulated Change in Wages Under Monopsonistic 
Competition and Pure Monopsony 
 
                                                
86 An H-1B dependent employer, defined as one that has greater than 15% of their workforce on H-1B visas, may be 
exempted from additional regulatory burdens by paying the worker the higher of the prevailing wage or $60,000. 
See Department of Labor, Employment Law Guide, https://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/elg/h1b.htm. 
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III. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper, we contribute to the growing literature on employer concentration as a 
source of imperfect competition in labor markets, as well as to a large literature on the abuses 
that occur in guest worker programs. We first document the frequency and nature of federal 
lawsuits filed by migrants on guest worker visas and find that cases involving antitrust claims are 
rare. We propose that a monopsonistic labor market may better explain these abuses than a 
competitive labor market. In a review of recent literature on monopsonistic models, we illustrate 
that labor markets may deviate from perfect competition for two basic reasons. With frictions to 
mobility, many firms may compete for workers, but the costs of mobility will reduce turnover 
and yield a labor market characterized by monopsonistic competition. The market structure of 
guest worker programs, characterized as they are by institutional frictions to job mobility, is 
consistent with mobility costs leading to monopsonistic competition. A second way a market 
deviates from perfect competition is if the market becomes oligopsonistic on account of too 
many jobs being concentrated among too few firms. An oligopsonistic market for many guest 
workers is also consistent with the level of HHIs that we calculate. These facts imply firms that 
employ guest workers have wage setting power, especially in more concentrated labor markets.  
To our knowledge, ours is the first study to test the prediction that oligopsony lowers 
wages in the market for guest workers. Using LCA data, we find strong evidence in favor of a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between market concentration and wages paid 
to guest workers. Some caveats, discussed in detail infra., II.A., are suggested for the 
interpretation of our results. To summarize: limitations to the data, especially for certain visas, 
choices made while cleaning the data, and statistical modeling choices all bound the breadth of 
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our conclusions. For this reason, we report full results and additional robustness checks in 
Appendix A - Figures and Appendix B - Tables. 
Having found evidence of oligopsony, the relative importance of institutional and natural 
frictions compared to oligopsony as a source of monopsony power is important to determine. We 
provide some evidence of this by adopting the recent framework of Naidu & Posner. We 
calibrate their model with levels of labor market concentration in the market for H-1B computer 
professionals calculated here, along with earlier estimates of labor supply to the firm from DNS. 
This exercise suggests that both frictions and concentration play an important role in determining 
wages. The simulation results, however, generally predict a greater decline in wages from 
increased market concentration than we find in our empirical results. This apparent inconsistency 
may be explained by the fact that the Department of Labor reviews proposed wages of H-1B 
workers, as well as effectively imposing a minimum wage of $60,000 for the largest employers, 
thus curtailing much of the oligopsonistic power that firms would otherwise possess. At the same 
time, workers’ immobility may still serve as an explanation for the abuses that occur in guest 
worker programs. Further, a high floor on wages could place additional pressure on firms in 
competitive output industries to speed up production, reduce safety spending, or provide 
substandard accommodations. 
These results may have important implications for policymakers. The above findings 
suggest that current policies are somewhat curbing the power of firms. Nevertheless, it may be 
prudent for the OFLC (which certifies labor condition applications) to incorporate concentration-
based guidelines when determining the degree of scrutiny to apply to a proposed wage in an 
application. If a lone employer recruits in a commuting zone for a given occupation, such an 
employer might have the power to influence the wage survey instrument used to determine the 
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prevailing wage. At the same time, it may also make sense for regulators to apply less scrutiny 
when examining applications from labor markets with markers of a high degree of competition 
and job mobility within the U.S. In addition, it would make sense for visa programs not covered 
by the LCA program, such as the J-1 and other cultural exchange programs, to be covered by a 
prevailing wage certification process. Flawed as it is, the LCA program’s wage floor appears to 
prevent worse exploitation. In other words, antitrust policy need not be carried out by those with 
the power to block mergers or prosecute anticompetitive behavior alone. 
 Policymakers might also reconsider legislatively constructed frictions to the mobility of 
guest workers, and revisions to immigration regulations that constrain the job mobility of guest 
workers. For example, guest worker program design that was cognizant of monopsony power 
would reduce the fees and regulatory burdens required for a worker to move between jobs. Such 
changes could increase wages to workers as well as the overall value provided by these markets 
to society. Given that these programs are typically constructed to be self-funding based upon 
fees, exploring other sources of revenue, for example, a small payroll tax on these workers, may 
be of use. Such a tax, while imposing a burden on the employer, would not impose a substantial 
fixed cost to recruiting an employed guest worker whose visa is sponsored by another employer. 
More generally, our results provide some insight into how to reign in market power in a 
labor market plagued by frictions and some degree of concentration. As Manning’s 2003 
framework for estimating labor market imperfections has helped to bring back to prominence the 
1933 model of Joan Robinson, the attention of academics, public intellectuals, policymakers, and 
politicians alike has turned towards the monopsonistic view of labor markets. As this 
bourgeoning literature has expanded into an analysis of the causes and consequences of this 
market structure, the last two years have witnessed a blossoming of studies on the relationship 
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between labor market concentration and wages. As the methods through which economists 
scrutinize the competitiveness of input markets continues to evolve, ultimately, the methods will 
hopefully approach a degree of sophistication that can be as practically useful as the scrutiny 
applied to the competitiveness of output markets.  
Someday, many of the same basic notions and approaches of antitrust policy could be 
implemented in a similar manner towards input markets to properly scrutinize mergers, identify 
anti-competitive behavior, and determine damages to workers who have been harmed by such 
behavior. Unquestionably, future quantitative research is needed to advance in this direction. 
Thus, obtaining a better understanding of the functioning of guest worker labor markets may not 
only inform policymakers interested in these particular labor markets, but also lead to a better 
understanding of the function (or dysfunction) of labor markets in general. 
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0 .15 .25 .5 .75 1
HHI
Min E−A .2, E−C 221.3 Max E−A 1.9, E−C 1.9 
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This table presents a region level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2-digit 
occupation controls. Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as 




Table 1: H-1B: Census Region Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, 
Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Occ 0 
HHI 0.6741 -0.7632 -0.627 . . 
 (0.1543) (0.3801) (0.1207) . . 
N 68 68 68 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI -0.5472 -0.5587 -0.5894 -0.0543 -0.0662 
 (0.0708) (0.069) (0.0671) (0.0633) (0.0695) 
N 322 322 322 322 322 
Occ 2 
HHI -0.2773 -0.2767 -0.2882 -0.0076 -0.0232 
 (0.0346) (0.0349) (0.0346) (0.0434) (0.0448) 
N 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Region      X    X 
	2 
Table 2: H-1B: Census Region Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 0 
HHI Bar 0.032 0.032 0.032 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 37.7161 -7.8303 5.2459 . . 
 (13.0391) (15.6376) (5.2125) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.0496 0.0496 0.0496 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 55.3233 -10.078 8.1902 . . 
 (19.2522) (22.9107) (7.6115) . . 
Total Effect 309.2255 -36.8755 51.5961 . . 
 (108.9647) (127.6489) (42.0708) . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0.0776 0 . . 
N 68 68 68 . . 
OCC 1 
HHI Bar 0.0998 0.0998 0.0998 0.0998 0.0998 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar -1.7156 -1.8795 -2.0539 0.0646 -0.0468 
 (0.3064) (0.3123) (0.3014) (0.3042) (0.2943) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0501 0.0501 0.0501 0.0501 0.0501 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar -1.7213 -1.8818 -2.0438 0.0814 -0.0132 
 (0.3039) (0.3099) (0.2987) (0.3031) (0.2958) 
Total Effect -0.4604 -0.474 -0.5586 -0.1185 -0.197 
 (0.0327) (0.0444) (0.0505) (0.0593) (0.0528) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.1655 0.0019 
N 322 322 322 322 322 
OCC 2 
HHI Bar 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar -1.0561 -1.1688 -1.179 0.4983 0.4573 
 (0.1853) (0.1894) (0.188) (0.1707) (0.1713) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0747 0.0747 0.0747 0.0747 0.0747 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar -1.1164 -1.2339 -1.2433 0.4972 0.4575 
 (0.1787) (0.1827) (0.1815) (0.1645) (0.1651) 
Total Fixed Effects -0.2231 -0.2231 -0.2358 0.0311 0.0144 
 (0.0435) (0.0438) (0.0434) (0.0499) (0.051) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.0211 0.0342 
N 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Region      X    X 
This table presents a region level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit 
occupation controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and region level labor market, 
and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a labor market (HHI W-Bar is weighted by 
the number of employees requested in a certified LCA). Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect 






Table 3: H-1B: Linear Regional Level Analysis, Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Occ 0 
HHI 0.4817 -0.808 -0.608 . . 
 (0.1627) (0.3681) (0.1281) . . 
N 68 68 68 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI 0.4126 -0.781 -0.623 -0.75 -0.56 
 (0.1628) (0.2825) (0.0854) (0.2973) (0.1003) 
N 322 322 322 322 322 
Occ 2 
HHI 0.1802 -0.201 -0.06 -0.185 -0.019 
 (0.0686) (0.1036) (0.0662) (0.1195) (0.0691) 
N 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Region      X    X 
This table presents a region level weighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit occupation 
controls. Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the 


















Table 4: H-1B: Census Region Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 0 
HHI Bar 0.032 0.032 0.032 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 39.457 -9.1044 6.1316 . . 
 (15.3561) (14.8287) (6.1426) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.0496 0.0496 0.0496 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 57.9215 -11.553 9.4426 . . 
 (22.5494) (21.7001) (8.8953) . . 
Total Effect 324.033 -39.654 57.86 . . 
 (125.71) (120.437) (47.953) . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0.0072 0 . . 
N 68 68 68 . . 
OCC 1 
HHI Bar 0.0998 0.0998 0.0998 0.0998 0.0998 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.8357 -4.4094 -1.078 -4.522 -1.136 
 (0.9986) (1.2092) (0.4066) (1.2089) (0.4125) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0501 0.0501 0.0501 0.0501 0.0501 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 0.8801 -3.9005 -1.011 -4.042 -1.103 
 (0.8385) (1.0505) (0.3418) (1.0504) (0.3464) 
Total Effect -0.5315 -0.7142 -0.643 -0.283 -0.24 
 (0.0583) (0.0797) (0.025) (0.0777) (0.0285) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.0001 0 
N 322 322 322 322 322 
OCC 2 
HHI Bar 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.149 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.2107 -1.1711 -0.675 -1.489 -0.93 
 (0.3343) (0.2929) (0.2077) (0.3584) (0.1929) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0747 0.0747 0.0747 0.0747 0.0747 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 0.3053 -1.0459 -0.532 -1.373 -0.821 
 (0.272) (0.2788) (0.1824) (0.3278) (0.1696) 
Total Effect -0.2422 -0.4917 -0.508 -0.336 -0.272 
 (0.2969) (0.1086) (0.1355) (0.1933) (0.1141) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0456 0 0.0007 0.0002 0 
N 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Region      X    X 
This table presents a region level weighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit occupation 
controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and region level labor market, and HHI W-
Bar represents the average concentration faced by a guest worker (HHI W-Bar is weighted by the number of 
employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to 




Table 5: H-1B: Census Division Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, 
Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Occ 0 
HHI 0.1572 -0.225 -0.202 . . 
 (0.0696) (0.0601) (0.0313) . . 
N 153 153 153 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI -0.3261 -0.317 -0.336 -0.019 0.0202 
 (0.0491) (0.0485) (0.0471) (0.0518) (0.052) 
N 705 705 705 705 705 
Occ 2 
HHI -0.2717 -0.274 -0.275 -0.034 -0.007 
 (0.0179) (0.018) (0.0181) (0.0236) (0.0249) 
N 2755 2755 2755 2755 2755 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Division     X    X 
 
This table presents a division level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls.  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the 
















Table 6: H-1B: Census Division Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, 
Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 0 
HHI Bar 0.0393 0.0393 0.0393 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 1.7478 -2.043 -0.624 . . 
 (0.8695) (0.8371) (0.5287) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.0689 0.0689 0.0689 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 2.2679 -2.724 -0.75 . . 
 (1.2283) (1.168) (0.7221) . . 
Total Effect 4.8016 -6.499 -1.33 . . 
 (3.3917) (3.1332) (1.8136) . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0071 0.001 0 . . 
N 153 153 153 . . 
OCC 1 
HHI Bar 0.1808 0.1808 0.1808 0.1808 0.1808 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar -1.237 -1.347 -1.446 0.1353 0.186 
 (0.2203) (0.2225) (0.2137) (0.2311) (0.2249) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0695 0.0695 0.0695 0.0695 0.0695 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar -1.394 -1.495 -1.597 0.0701 0.1253 
 (0.2054) (0.2077) (0.1988) (0.2185) (0.2134) 
Total Effect -0.223 -0.23 -0.252 0.0344 0.0698 
 (0.0711) (0.0708) (0.0683) (0.072) (0.0707) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.1367 0.3966 
N 705 705 705 705 705 
OCC 2 
HHI Bar 0.2091 0.2091 0.2091 0.2091 0.2091 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar -1.131 -1.241 -1.22 -0.176 0.0185 
 (0.1364) (0.1364) (0.1359) (0.122) (0.1224) 
HHI W-Bar 0.1005 0.1005 0.1005 0.1005 0.1005 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar -1.22 -1.34 -1.319 -0.198 0.0048 
 (0.1331) (0.1332) (0.1329) (0.1183) (0.1193) 
Total Effect -0.269 -0.275 -0.276 -0.046 -0.007 
 (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.021) (0.025) (0.0262) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.0121 0.6814 
N 2755 2755 2755 2755 2755 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Division     X    X 
This table presents a division level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and division 
level labor market, and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by labor market (HHI W-
Bar is weighted by the number of employees requested in a certified LCA). Moving from left to right, a 
battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard 




Table 7: H-1B: Census Division Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, 
Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Occ 0 
HHI 0.1113 -0.4319 -0.251 . . 
 (0.1022) (0.1306) (0.0449) . . 
N 153 153 153 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI 0.0898 -0.439 -0.2726 -0.4264 -0.2508 
 (0.0981) (0.1177) (0.0409) (0.1194) (0.0395) 
N 705 705 705 705 705 
Occ 2 
HHI 0.0117 -0.2434 -0.1093 -0.2468 -0.1118 
 (0.0473) (0.0594) (0.0371) (0.0597) (0.0366) 
N 2755 2755 2755 2755 2755 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Division     X    X 
This table presents a division level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls.  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as 

















Table 8: H-1B: Census Division Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 0 
HHI Bar 0.0393 0.0393 0.0393 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 2.0653 -3.132 -0.343 . . 
 (1.1712) (1.2666) (0.5173) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.0689 0.0689 0.0689 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 2.6679 -3.995 -0.312 . . 
 (1.6455) (1.7247) (0.7052) . . 
Total Effect 5.4611 -8.289 0.0978 . . 
 (4.4369) (4.336) (1.7627) . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0272 0.0005 0 . . 
N 153 153 153 . . 
OCC 1 
HHI Bar 0.1808 0.1808 0.1808 0.1808 0.1808 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.4187 -1.245 -0.667 -0.964 -0.372 
 (0.3115) (0.3444) (0.1232) (0.3494) (0.1254) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0695 0.0695 0.0695 0.0695 0.0695 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 0.5374 -1.079 -0.543 -0.946 -0.403 
 (0.2709) (0.319) (0.1144) (0.322) (0.115) 
Total Effect -0.457 -0.669 -0.511 -0.3 -0.118 
 (0.1222) (0.1414) (0.0271) (0.1426) (0.0328) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.0004 0 
N 705 705 705 705 705 
OCC 2 
HHI Bar 0.2091 0.2091 0.2091 0.2091 0.2091 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.2339 -0.995 -0.59 -0.896 -0.49 
 (0.3662) (0.2225) (0.1558) (0.298) (0.1765) 
HHI W-Bar 0.1005 0.1005 0.1005 0.1005 0.1005 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 0.2893 -0.864 -0.448 -0.863 -0.458 
 (0.2699) (0.2009) (0.1316) (0.2471) (0.136) 
Total Effect -0.16 -0.526 -0.436 -0.292 -0.175 
 (0.2882) (0.1197) (0.1017) (0.1994) (0.1503) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.2204 0 0 0 0.0001 
N 2755 2755 2755 2755 2755 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Division     X    X 
This table presents a division level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and division level labor 
market, and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a guest worker (HHI W-Bar is weighted by 
the number of employees requested in a certified LCA). Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect 





Table 9: H-1B: Census State Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Occ 0 
HHI 0.1624 -0.0107 -0.0761 . . . . . 
 (0.0662) (0.074) (0.0691) . . . . . 
N 867 867 867 . . . . . 
Occ 1 
HHI -0.2618 -0.262 -0.286 -0.0795 -0.0423 -0.0114 -0.0488 -0.0487 
 (0.0204) (0.0206) (0.019) (0.0252) (0.0255) (0.0295) (0.0246) (0.0323) 
N 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 
Occ 2 
HHI -0.2616 -0.2732 -0.2793 -0.1095 -0.0627 -0.02 -0.0688 -0.0705 
 (0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0126) (0.0199) (0.017) (0.0197) (0.0151) (0.0173) 
N 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 
 Fixed Effects          
 Year                X X X X X X X 
 Occ    X X X X X 
  State     X    X X X X 
 OccXGeo      X   
 OccXYear       X  
 GeoXYear        X 
This table presents a state level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit occupation controls.  Moving from left 
to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are 






Table 10: H-1B: Census State Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OCC 
0 
HHI Bar 0.0807 0.0807 0.0807 . . . . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.7493 -0.116 -0.2234 . . . . . 
 (0.4156) (0.4881) (0.2741) . . . . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.1411 0.1411 0.1411 . . . . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.8537 -0.0909 -0.1741 . . . . . 
 (0.4674) (0.5456) (0.3269) . . . . . 
Total Effect 0.5493 0.0887 0.1106 . . . . . 
 (0.2583) (0.2811) (0.2095) . . . . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0033 0.7978 0.0685 . . . . . 
N 867 867 867 . . . . . 
OCC 
1 
HHI Bar 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar -0.6714 -0.7645 -0.8579 -0.1106 -0.0055 -0.0379 -0.0805 0.0976 
 (0.1943) (0.1887) (0.1745) (0.1732) (0.1592) (0.1628) (0.1615) (0.2131) 
HHI W-Bar 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar -0.8604 -0.9646 -1.0769 -0.1448 -0.0376 -0.0492 -0.1117 0.0686 
 (0.1885) (0.1818) (0.1691) (0.1754) (0.1655) (0.1717) (0.17) (0.2209) 
Total Effect -0.2953 -0.3027 -0.3327 -0.0882 -0.0477 -0.017 -0.0607 -0.0433 
 (0.0212) (0.0217) (0.0185) (0.0311) (0.0322) (0.0323) (0.0341) (0.0393) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.0288 0.3651 0.9583 0.257 0.4249 
N 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 
OCC 
2 
HHI Bar 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar -0.767 -0.8215 -1.034 -0.431 -0.264 -0.1982 -0.2136 -0.2829 
 (0.116) (0.1073) (0.0984) (0.1045) (0.1066) (0.1029) (0.1076) 0.1155 
HHI W-Bar 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar -0.8433 -0.9075 -1.1359 -0.4831 -0.306 -0.2336 -0.2473 -0.3251 
 (0.1183) (0.1094) (0.1002) (0.1079) (0.1108) (0.1058) (0.1125) (0.12) 
Total Effect -0.2921 -0.3073 -0.3339 -0.1331 -0.0902 -0.045 -0.0911 -0.0988 
 (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0145) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0246) (0.0219) (0.0234) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0 0.0003 0.0185 0.0003 0.0002 
N 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 
 Fixed Effects          
 Year                X X X X X X X 
 Occ    X X X X X 
  State     X    X X X X 
 Interactions      OccXGeo OccXYear GeoXYear 
This table presents a state level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit occupation controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and state 
level labor market, and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a labor market (HHI W-Bar is weighted by the number of employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left 




Table 11: H-1B: Census State Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Occ 0 
HHI 0.1002 -0.0501 -0.0087 . . . . . 
 (0.0909) (0.1252) (0.0674) . . . . . 
N 867 867 867 . . . . . 
Occ 1 
HHI 0.0949 -0.0556 -0.0225 -0.0522 -0.0125 -0.0108 -0.0069 -0.119 
 (0.0919) (0.1242) (0.0666) (0.1232) (0.0641) (0.0672) (0.0656) (0.0861) 
N 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 
Occ 2 
HHI 0.0447 -0.0752 -0.0381 -0.0696 -0.0367 -0.0079 -0.0476 -0.0414 
 (0.0862) (0.098) (0.042) (0.094) (0.0483) (0.0569) (0.0467) (0.05) 
N 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 
 Fixed Effects          
 Year                X X X X X X X 
 Occ    X X X X X 
  State     X    X X X X 
 OccXGeo      X   
 OccXYear       X  
 GeoXYear        X 
 
This table presents a state level weighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit occupation controls. Moving from left to 
right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are clustered 









Table 12: H-1B: Census State Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OCC 
0 
HHI Bar 0.0807 0.0807 0.0807 . . . . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.7145 -0.4555 -0.2033 . . . . . 
 (0.442) (0.7049) (0.1512) . . . . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.1411 0.1411 0.1411 . . . . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.8908 -0.3526 -0.1633 . . . . . 
 (0.4747) (0.7496) (0.1661) . . . . . 
Total Effect 0.6877 0.2044 0.0988 . . . . . 
 (0.1793) (0.2605) (0.0787) . . . . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0.0005 . . . . . 
N 867 867 867 . . . . . 
OCC 
1 
HHI Bar 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 0.3865 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 1.098 -0.2771 -0.3472 -0.0677 -0.1025 -0.0695 -0.0423 -0.5714 
 (0.5698) (0.8347) (0.3009) (0.8412) (0.2141) (0.2479) (0.2161) (0.9419) 
HHI W-Bar 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 0.1421 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.5969 -0.5599 -0.3765 -0.432 -0.2264 -0.2104 -0.1863 -0.7068 
 (0.4397) (0.6773) (0.1955) (0.6863) (0.151) (0.175) (0.153) (0.9495) 
Total Effect 0.5012 0.0808 -0.034 0.1554 0.0596 0.0762 0.0839 -0.106 
 (0.1565) (0.2284) (0.1132) (0.2264) (0.0696) (0.0791) (0.0708) (0.1039) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0.0003 0.0035 0 0.0009 0.0005 0.0005 0.314 
N 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 2917 
OCC 
2 
HHI Bar 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 0.3112 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar -0.1605 -0.6755 -0.5953 -0.5503 -0.4624 -0.4348 -0.3152 -0.5293 
 (0.3635) (0.3491) (0.1436) (0.3233) (0.1464) (0.1209) (0.1971) (0.1396) 
HHI W-Bar 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 0.1846 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar -0.1765 -0.7061 -0.5667 -0.6164 -0.4719 -0.4516 -0.3237 -0.5178 
 (0.3429) (0.352) (0.1301) (0.3273) (0.1231) (0.1021) (0.1735) (0.1207) 
Total Effect 0.0429 -0.1117 -0.1217 -0.0591 -0.0689 -0.0314 -0.0673 -0.0876 
 (0.0424) (0.0625) (0.0294) (0.0499) (0.0361) (0.0487) (0.0414) (0.0594) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0218 0.2366 0 0.1875 0 0 0.0064 0.0001 
N 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 11614 
 Fixed Effects          
 Year                X X X X X X X 
 Occ    X X X X X 
  State     X    X X X X 
 Interactions      OccXGeo OccXYear GeoXYear 
This table presents a state level weighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit occupation controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and state level 
labor market, and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a guest worker (HHI W-Bar is weighted by the number of employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to 
right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. 
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Table 13: H-1B: Census Commuting Zone Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, 
Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Occ 0 
HHI -0.1736 -0.1793 -0.1388 . . 
 (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0218) . . 
N 10150 10150 10150 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI -0.2474 -0.2515 -0.2738 -0.1626 -0.1146 
 (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0102) (0.0136) (0.0142) 
N 14640 14640 14640 14640 14640 
Occ 2 
HHI -0.1918 -0.1982 -0.3021 -0.1445 -0.094 
 (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0071) 
N 56802 56802 56802 56802 56802 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  CZ     X    X 
This table presents a commuting zone level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and commuting zone level 
labor market.  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as indicated in 

















Table 14: H-1B: Census Commuting Zone Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, 
Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 
0 
HHI Bar 0.4078 0.4078 0.4078 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.2571 0.2101 -0.1071 . . 
 (0.1221) (0.1221) (0.12) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.085 0.085 0.085 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.3518 0.2912 -0.0979 . . 
 (0.1319) (0.1319) (0.132) . . 
Total Effect -0.1265 -0.1368 -0.1331 . . 
 0.0201 0.0204 0.0259 . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 . . 
N 10150 10150 10150 . . 
OCC 
1 
HHI Bar 0.5066 0.5066 0.5066 0.5066 0.5066 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar -0.1041 -0.1378 -0.6892 0.1463 -0.0491 
 (0.1085) (0.1078) (0.0981) (0.1084) (0.1005) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0886 0.0886 0.0886 0.0886 0.0886 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.006 -0.0409 -0.8273 0.2022 -0.0195 
 (0.1247) (0.124) (0.1099) (0.1213) (0.1147) 
Total Effect -0.2206 -0.2289 -0.3278 -0.1282 -0.1015 
 (0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0136) (0.0175) (0.0205) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0 0 
N 14640 14640 14640 14640 14640 
OCC 
2 
HHI Bar 0.5802 0.5802 0.5802 0.5802 0.5802 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar -0.427 -0.43 -0.7972 -0.3696 -0.2607 
 (0.0783) (0.0769) (0.063) (0.0643) (0.0531) 
HHI W-Bar 0.1467 0.1467 0.1467 0.1467 0.1467 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar -0.3975 -0.411 -0.9836 -0.4519 -0.3547 
 (0.0965) (0.0949) (0.075) (0.0796) (0.0655) 
Total Effect -0.2061 -0.214 -0.3848 -0.1783 -0.1336 
 (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.012) (0.0129) (0.0119) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0 0 
N 56802 56802 56802 56802 56802 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  CZ     X    X 
This table presents a commuting zone level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and commuting zone level 
labor market, and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a labor market (HHI W-Bar is weighted 
by the number of employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect 
controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are clustered 
at the commuting zone level.  
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Table 15: H-1B: Census Commuting Zone Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on 
HHI, Weighted 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Occ 0 
HHI -0.0882 -0.1049 -0.112 . . 
 (0.0518) (0.0444) (0.0463) . . 
N 10150 10150 10150 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI -0.1032 -0.1226 -0.2293 -0.0963 -0.0764 
 (0.0483) (0.0416) (0.0485) (0.0417) (0.0428) 
N 14640 14640 14640 14640 14640 
Occ 2 
HHI -0.1302 -0.1428 -0.1654 -0.1091 -0.0694 
 (0.0443) (0.0424) (0.039) (0.0375) (0.0365) 
N 56802 56802 56802 56802 56802 
 Fixed 
Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  CZ     X    X 
This table presents a commuting zone level weighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls.  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as 


















Table 16: H-1B: Census Commuting Zone Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, 
Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 
0 
HHI Bar 0.4078 0.4078 0.4078 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.2852 0.102 -0.0044 . . 
 (0.3777) (0.3048) (0.1903) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.085 0.085 0.085 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.2785 0.1122 0.0169 . . 
 (0.3127) (0.2524) (0.1933) . . 
Total Effect -0.0817 -0.1082 -0.1098 . . 
 (0.0752) (0.0662) (0.0497) . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.011 0.0095 0.0424 . . 
N 10150 10150 10150 . . 
OCC 
1 
HHI Bar 0.5066 0.5066 0.5066 0.5066 0.5066 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.0297 -0.1603 -0.603 0.0992 0.0091 
 (0.3642) (0.2989) (0.2831) (0.286) (0.1779) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0886 0.0886 0.0886 0.0886 0.0886 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.2018 0.0204 -0.4276 0.1324 0.0578 
 (0.2938) (0.2401) (0.2675) (0.2373) (0.1883) 
Total Effect -0.1687 -0.1925 -0.2901 -0.1066 -0.0775 
 (0.065) (0.0575) (0.0602) (0.0522) (0.0443) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0002 0.0001 0 0.005 0.0966 
N 14640 14640 14640 14640 14640 
OCC 
2 
HHI Bar 0.5802 0.5802 0.5802 0.5802 0.5802 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.0675 0.04 -0.3658 0.2258 0.0273 
 (0.3153) (0.2689) (0.216) (0.2418) (0.1654) 
HHI W-Bar 0.1467 0.1467 0.1467 0.1467 0.1467 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.1874 0.125 -0.3319 0.3038 0.0662 
 (0.3002) (0.2575) (0.2058) (0.2259) (0.1531) 
Total Effect -0.1446 -0.1501 -0.1908 -0.1029 -0.0662 
 (0.0424) (0.0366) (0.0412) (0.0341) (0.0393) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0 0.0229 
N 56802 56802 56802 56802 56802 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  CZ     X    X 
This table presents a commuting zone level weighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and commuting zone level 
labor market, and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a guest worker (HHI W-Bar is 
weighted by the number of employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed 
effect controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are 




This table presents a region level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls. Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as 
indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are robust.  
  
Table 17: H-2B: Census Region Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, 
Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Occ 0 
HHI 0.8851 3.8759 1.1589 . . 
 (4.3374) (3.4660) (4.3842) . . 
N 72 72 72 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI 0.2248 0.2930 0.3891 -0.2843 -0.2104 
 (0.1278) (0.1017) (0.1100) (0.0874) (0.1025) 
N 360 360 360 360 360 
Occ 2 
HHI 0.2580 0.2589 0.2758 -0.2054 -.2010 
 (0.0400) (0.0391) (0.0387) (0.0498) (0.0519) 
N 1075 1075 1075 1075 1075 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Region      X    X 
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Table 18: H-2B: Census Region Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 
0 
HHI Bar 0.0056 0.0056 0.0056 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 716.2942 88.6857 134.6921 . . 
 (1625.8154) (905.5477) (1092.3892) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 552.3880 70.0839 105.7159 . . 
 (1255.1388) (698.5335) (844.0555) . . 
Total Effect 4.11e+04 4610.4911 7188.3656 . . 
 (9.27e+04) (5.18e+04) (6.21e+04) . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.1272 0.5892 0.8728 . . 
N 72 72 72 . . 
OCC 
1 
HHI Bar 0.0835 0.0835 0.0835 0.0835 0.0835 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 1.3940 1.8623 1.8270 1.1048 1.2842 
 (0.5522) (0.4513) (0.4291) (0.5375) (0.5671) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 1.4800 1.8412 1.8331 1.0490 1.2544 
 (0.5026) (0.4014) (0.3818) (0.5040) (0.5387) 
Total Effect -0.1171 0.2706 0.2918 -0.0088 0.0475 
 (0.1979) (0.2121) (0.1933) (0.2090) (0.2010) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.0009 0.0054 
N 360 360 360 360 360 
OCC 
2 
HHI Bar 0.2712 0.2712 0.2712 0.2712 0.2712 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.7792 1.0462 1.0559 0.2646 0.1660 
 (0.2805) (0.2663) (0.2571) (0.2827) (0.2653) 
HHI W-Bar .0324 .0324 .0324 .0324 .0324 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 1.0192 1.2692 1.3048 0.2260 0.1331 
 (0.2749) (0.2510) (0.2437) (0.2781) (0.2676) 
Total Effect 0.2575 0.2783 0.2932 -0.1602 -0.1643 
 (0.0503) (0.0481) (0.0475) (0.0538) (0.0545) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.0002 0.0010 
N 1075 1075 1075 1075 1075 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Region      X    X 
This table presents a region level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and region level labor 
market, and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a labor market (HHI W-Bar is weighted by 
the number of employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect 
controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are robust. 
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Table 19: H-2B: Linear Regional Level Analysis, Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Occ 0 
HHI 2.6625 9.4058 3.3352 . . 
 (6.9634) (2.7633) (4.4694) . . 
N 72 72 72 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI 0.9766 1.2409 1.1036 0.3480 0.2253 
 (0.3152) (0.2303) (0.2168) (0.219) (0.1869) 
N 360 360 360 360 360 
Occ 2 
HHI 0.4053 0.6046 0.5388 0.0504 -0.0513 
 (0.1402) (0.0796) (0.0789) (0.080) (0.0795) 
N 1075 1075 1075 1075 1075 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Region      X    X 
This table presents a region level weighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit occupation 
controls. Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the 
bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are robust.  
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Table 20: H-2B: Census Region Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 
0 
HHI Bar 0.0056 0.0056 0.0056 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 3525.4039 368.7910 -176.2 . . 
 (2558.99) (838.85) (1128.65) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 2720.54 287.65 -134.91 . . 
 (1975.21) (646.87) (872.66) . . 
Total Effect 2.01e+05 2.02e+04 -1.0e+04 . . 
 (1.46e+05) (4.80e+04) (6.40e+04) . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.1767 0.0109 0.8894 . . 
N 72 72 72 . . 
OCC 
1 
HHI Bar 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 3.2513 5.0796 4.6815 4.014 3.083 
 (1.37) (0.68) (0.71) (0.85) (0.88) 
HHI W-Bar 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 3.20 4.49 4.31 3.70 2.88 
 (1.18) (0.56) (0.59) (0.75) (0.80) 
Total Effect 0.36 1.41 1.37 1.02 0.73 
 (0.62) (0.58) (0.57) (0.52) (0.44) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0 0.003 
N 360 360 360 360 360 
OCC 
2 
HHI Bar 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.271 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 1.00 1.84 1.62 1.31 0.69 
 (0.83) (0.42) (0.43) (0.41) (0.43) 
HHI W-Bar 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-
Bar 1.19 2.05 1.81 1.32 0.72 
 (0.69) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35) (0.37) 
Total Effect 0.11 0.20 0.21 -0.003 -0.08 
 (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) (0.067) (0.10) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.002 0 0 0.0001 0.023 
N 1075 1075 1075 1075 1075 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Region      X    X 
This table presents a region level weighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit occupation 
controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and region level labor market, and HHI W-
Bar represents the average concentration faced by a guest worker (HHI W-Bar is weighted by the number of 
employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to 





Table 21: H-2B: Census Division Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, 
Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Occ 0 
HHI 1.21 3.14 2.55 . . 
 (1.58) (1.31) (2.02) . . 
N 162 162 162 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI 0.08 0.11 0.17 -0.11 -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
N 798 798 798 798 798 
Occ 2 
HHI 0.23 0.23 0.24 -0.06 -0.05 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
N 2130 2130 2130 2130 2130 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Division     X    X 
This table presents a division level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls.  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as 
indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are robust. 
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Table 22: H-2B: Census Division Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 0 
HHI Bar 0.013 0.013 0.013 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 81.77 -93.82 -123.85 . . 
 (450.29) (373.22) (360.00) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.009 0.009 0.009 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 55.16 -66.86 -87.89 . . 
 (315.19) (260.23) (251.57) . . 
Total Effect 2225.07 -2e+03 -3e+03 . . 
 1.10e+04 9219.92 8836.69 . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.20 0.02 0.39 . . 
N 162 162 162 . . 
OCC 1 
HHI Bar 0.1674 0.1674 0.1674 0.1674 0.1674 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 1.29 1.53 1.44 1.22 1.23 
 (0.33) (0.30) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HHI W-Bar 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 1.45 1.68 1.57 1.29 1.30 
 (0.31) (0.27) (0.26) (0.32) (0.33) 
Total Effect 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.09 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0 0.0002 
N 798 798 798 798 798 
OCC 2 
HHI Bar 0.3508 0.3508 0.3508 0.3508 0.3508 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.72 0.77 0.79 0.20 0.10 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
HHI W-Bar 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.82 0.89 0.89 0.21 0.06 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
Total Effect 0.26 0.27 0.29 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.12 0.20 
N 2130 2130 2130 2130 2130 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Division     X    X 
This table presents a division level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and division level labor 
market, and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by labor market (HHI W-Bar is weighted by 
the number of employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect 
controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are robust. 
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Table 23: H-2B: Census Division Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on 
HHI, Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Occ 0 
HHI 0.05 2.51 1.36 . . 
 (2.64) (1.38) (2.12) . . 
N 162 162 162 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI 0.59 0.76 0.72 0.23 0.19 
 (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) 
N 798 798 798 798 798 
Occ 2 
HHI 0.24 0.38 0.35 0.03 -0.02 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
N 2130 2130 2130 2130 2130 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Division     X    X 
This table presents a division level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls.  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as 




Table 24: H-2B: Census Division Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 0 
HHI Bar 0.013 0.013 0.013 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 437.05 394.57 142.32 . . 
 (894.56) (410.28) (484.34) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.009 0.009 0.009 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 304.69 275.59 99.49 . . 
 (625.08) (286.12) (338.59) . . 
Total Effect 1.08e+04 9712.07 3497.29 . . 
 (2.2e+04) (1.e+04) (1.2e+04) . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.95 0.35 0.95 . . 
N 162 162 162 . . 
OCC 1 
HHI Bar 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.95 2.50 2.90 1.79 1.91 
 (0.87) (0.44) (0.44) (0.46) (0.57) 
HHI W-Bar 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 1.31 2.64 2.93 1.87 1.96 
 (0.76) (0.37) (0.37) (0.41) (0.52) 
Total Effect -0.08 0.17 0.31 -0.02 0.10 
 (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0 0.0002 
N 798 798 798 798 798 
OCC 2 
HHI Bar 0.351 0.351 0.351 0.351 0.351 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.1 0.39 0.56 0.13 0.05 
 (0.55) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.35) 
HHI W-Bar 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.37 0.80 0.86 0.41 0.24 
 (0.50) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.32) 
Total Effect 0.08 0.12 0.15 -0.11 -0.11 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.002 0.05 
N 2130 2130 2130 2130 2130 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Division     X    X 
This table presents a division level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and division level labor 
market, and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a guest worker (HHI W-Bar is weighted by 
the number of employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect 





Table 25: H-2B: Census State Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, 
Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Occ 0 
HHI 0.21 0.22 0.16 . . 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.14) . . 
N 905 905 905 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
N 3580 3580 3580 3580 3580 
Occ 2 
HHI 0.10 0.11 0.11 -0.03 -0.05 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
N 7127 7127 7127 7127 7127 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  Division     X    X 
This table presents a division level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 
digit occupation controls.  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the 




Table 26: H-2B: Census State Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Unweighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 0 
HHI Bar 0.120 0.120 0.120 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.13 0.55 0.27 . . 
 (0.53) (0.51) (0.68) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.042 0.042 0.042 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.10 0.53 0.25 . . 
 (0.51) (0.48) (0.65) . . 
Total Effect 0.25 0.26 0.19 . . 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.20) . . 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.14 0.03 0.69 . . 
N 905 905 905 . . 
OCC 1 
HHI Bar 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.412 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.49 0.57 0.72 0.23 0.20 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) 
HHI W-Bar 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.63 0.73 0.91 0.91 0.26 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.21) (0.20) 
Total Effect 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.04 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0 0 0 0.45 0.50 
N 3580 3580 3580 3580 3580 
OCC 2 
HHI Bar 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.538 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.25 0.21 0.34 -0.17 -0.21 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) 
HHI W-Bar 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.31 0.27 0.44 -0.15 -0.21 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.15) 
Total Effect 0.12 0.13 0.15 -0.04 -0.07 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0001 0 0 0.2868 0.0177 
N 7127 7127 7127 7127 7127 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  State     X    X 
This table presents a state level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit occupation 
controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and division level labor market, and HHI 
W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by labor market (HHI W-Bar is weighted by the number of 
employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to 
the regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. 
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Table 27: H-2B: Census State Linear Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, 
Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
Occ 0 
HHI 0.11 0.14 -0.06 . . 
 (0.18) (0.15) (0.18) . . 
N 905 905 905 . . 
Occ 1 
HHI 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.08 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
N 3580 3580 3580 3580 3580 
Occ 2 
HHI 0.053 0.10 0.10 -0.04 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
N 7127 7127 7127 7127 7127 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  State     X    X 
This table presents a state level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit occupation 
controls.  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the 
bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. 
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Table 28: H-2B: Census State Cubic Analysis Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Weighted 
    1 2 3 4 5 
OCC 0 
HHI Bar 0.12 0.12 0.12 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.09 0.79 0.06 . . 
 (0.71) (0.49) (0.53) . . 
HHI W-Bar 0.042 0.042 0.042 . . 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar -0.08 0.62 -0.02 . . 
 (0.66) (0.46) (0.47) . . 
Total Effect 0.71 0.56 0.17 . . 
 (0.33) (0.20) (0.31) . . 
P-value on F on Cubic .046 0.06 0.89 . . 
N 905 905 905 . . 
OCC 1 
HHI Bar 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.412 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar -0.37 -0.04 0.31 -0.25 -0.30 
 (0.39) (0.28) (0.25) (0.33) (0.28) 
HHI W-Bar 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar -0.15 0.27 0.64 -0.02 -0.08 
 (0.36) (0.22) (0.23) (0.28) (0.28) 
Total Effect 0.09 0.11 0.16 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0016 0.0001 0 0.0731 0.0931 
N 3580 3580 3580 3580 3580 
OCC 2 
HHI Bar 0.5379 0.5379 0.5379 0.5379 0.5379 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar -0.32 -0.31 -0.18 -0.56 -0.61 
 (0.24) (0.22) (0.17) (0.24) (0.16) 
HHI W-Bar 0.1505 0.1505 0.1505 0.1505 0.1505 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar -0.15 -0.07 0.07 -0.39 -0.45 
 (0.25) (0.21) (0.16) (0.24) (0.17) 
Total Effect -0.002 0.03 0.04 -0.11 -0.13 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.075 0.002 0.0009 0.001 0.0001 
N 7127 7127 7127 7127 7127 
 Fixed Effects       
 Year                X X X X 
 Occ    X X 
  State     X    X 
This table presents a state level unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage with 0, 1, and 2 digit occupation 
controls. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in an occupation and division level labor market, and HHI 
W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a guest worker (HHI W-Bar is weighted by the number of 
employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to 







Table 29: H-2A: Linear Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Unweighted 
    1 2 3 
Census Region 
HHI 1.9336 -0.6254 4.3158 
 (1.314) (1.2486) (0.966) 
N 48 48 48 
Census Division 
HHI 1.6096 1.2196 0.9475 
 (0.5009) (0.4276) (0.4093) 
N 108 108 108 
State 
HHI -0.0488 -0.0395 0.0323 
 (0.0802) (0.0780) (0.1037) 
N 601 601 601 
Fixed Effects     
Year                 X X 
Geography      X 
This table presents an unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage at the Census Region, Census Division, 
and State geographical levels. Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the 
regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the geographical level. 
 
 
Table 30: H-2A: Linear Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Weighted 
    1 2 3 
Census Region 
HHI 4.1171 2.0059 3.5206 
 (1.4254) (0.6763) (1.1039) 
N 48 48 48 
Census Division 
HHI 2.5188 1.7303 0.6226 
 (0.6297) (0.3487) (0.4858) 
N 108 108 108 
State 
HHI -0.0163 -0.0733 -0.1390 
 (0.3167) (0.2781) (0.2670) 
N 601 601 601 
Fixed Effects     
Year                 X X 
Geography      X 
This table presents a weighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage at the Census Region, Census Division, and 
State geographical levels. Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect controls are added to the regression, as 
indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the geographical level. 
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Table 31: H-2A: Cubic Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Unweighted 
    1 2 3 
Census 
Region 
HHI Bar 0.0120 0.0120 0.0120 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 1664.9063 1786.5380 380.4654 
 (520.2920) (455.0222) (295.9730) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0106 0.0106 0.0106 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 1486.0388 1594.3598 340.1646 
 (464.1980) (405.8742) (264.3788) 
Total Effect 4.40e+04 4.72e+04 9907.0336 
 (1.38e+04) (1.21e+04) (7758.8819) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0100 0.0029 0.0002 
N 48 48 48 
Census 
Division 
HHI Bar 0.0216 0.0216 0.0216 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 302.3119 266.7028 94.3996 
 (95.6070) (91.4304) (44.4606) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0190 0.0190 0.0190 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 267.7870 236.2481 83.6693 
 (84.6005) (80.8658) (39.4046) 
Total Effect 4245.1054 3743.3641 1319.9881 
 (1353.9795) (1300.5006) (620.2819) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0001 0.0001 0.0015 
N 108 108 108 
State 
HHI Bar 0.1368 0.1368 0.1368 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 0.5155 0.5340 -0.1000 
 (0.3707) (0.3685) (0.3040) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0649 0.0649 0.0649 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 0.5520 0.5693 -0.1120 
 (0.3842) (0.3829) (0.3261) 
Total Effect -0.0835 -0.0716 0.0330 
 (0.0809) (0.0720) (0.0858) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0561 0.0790 0.6860 
N 601 601 601 
  
Fixed Effects     
Year                X X 
Geography     X 
This table presents an unweighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage at the Census Region, Census Division, 
and State geographical levels. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in a geographically defined labor 
market, and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a guest worker (HHI W-Bar is weighted by 
the number of employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect 
controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are clustered 






Table 32: H-2A: Cubic Regression of Log Wage on HHI, Weighted 
    1 2 3 
Census 
Region 
HHI Bar 0.0120 0.0120 0.0120 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 1484.2303 953.5633 272.4532 
 (585.6443) (343.2910) (240.4229) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0106 0.0106 0.0106 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 1325.5300 851.6058 244.3691 
 (522.6812) (306.4132) (214.8077) 
Total Effect 3.90e+04 2.50e+04 6869.1520 
 (1.55e+04) (9065.9315) (6291.3354) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0056 0.0061 0.0000 
N 48 48 48 
Census 
Division 
HHI Bar 0.0216 0.0216 0.0216 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 226.0648 145.8607 141.5099 
 (102.7518) (78.2747) (53.1863) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0190 0.0190 0.0190 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 200.3745 129.1905 125.4614 
 (90.9724) (69.1995) (47.0985) 
Total Effect 3158.9828 2053.7306 1968.6361 
 (1447.9085) (1117.5639) (747.5577) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.0004 0.0000 0.0269 
N 108 108 108 
State 
HHI Bar 0.1368 0.1368 0.1368 
Marginal Effect at HHI Bar 2.4287 1.8717 1.2975 
 (1.3155) (1.0973) (0.6671) 
HHI W-Bar 0.0649 0.0649 0.0649 
Marginal Effect at HHI W-Bar 1.9807 1.5128 1.0829 
 (0.9652) (0.7827) (0.5226) 
Total Effect 1.3080 0.9956 0.4513 
 (1.2738) (1.0572) (0.4729) 
P-value on F on Cubic 0.2066 0.2275 0.2018 
N 601 601 601 
  
Fixed Effects     
Year                X X 
Geography     X 
This table presents a weighted estimation of the effect of HHI on wage at the Census Region, Census Division, and 
State geographical levels. HHI Bar represents the average concentration in a geographically defined labor market, 
and HHI W-Bar represents the average concentration faced by a guest worker (HHI W-Bar is weighted by 
the number of employees requested in a certified LCA).  Moving from left to right, a battery of fixed effect 
controls are added to the regression, as indicated in the bottom panel. Standard Errors (in parentheses) are clustered 
at the geographical level. 
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Table 33: Instrumental Variables Results 













Total Effect -1.36 -3.89 
 (0.69) (21.08) 
First Stage F 15.89 0.11 
Inverse 
Unweighted Total Effect 0.31 -0.05 
 (0.10) (0.81) 
First Stage F 108.61 0.31 







This table presents results from instrumental variables estimations. The top panel uses an instrument of the average 
number of firms in other commuting zones in the same occupation and year; the bottom panel uses the average of 
the inverse of the number for firms. All estimates include year, two-digit occupation, and commuting zone fixed 
effects, with standard errors clustered at the commuting zone level. 
 
